Dare to Care:  The Complicated Case of Working Fathers Alleging Sex and Parental Discrimination by Matzner-Heruti, Ifat
Journal of Law and Policy
Volume 23 | Issue 1 Article 1
2014
Dare to Care: The Complicated Case of Working
Fathers Alleging Sex and Parental Discrimination
Ifat Matzner-Heruti
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/jlp
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Law and
Policy by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Ifat Matzner-Heruti, Dare to Care: The Complicated Case of Working Fathers Alleging Sex and Parental Discrimination, 23 J. L. & Pol'y
(2014).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/jlp/vol23/iss1/1


1

DARE TO CARE: THE COMPLICATED CASE OF 
WORKING FATHERS ALLEGING SEX AND PARENTAL 
DISCRIMINATION 
 
Ifat Matzner-Heruti* 
 
While there has been an increasing amount of comparative legal research 
into cross-national policies affecting working mothers, an analysis of how these 
policies affect working fathers is only in its infancy. Accordingly, this article 
investigates policy variations in the treatment of Israeli and American men as 
gendered workers and fathers. In particular, this article analyzes employment 
discrimination cases in which Israeli and American fathers alleged that they 
were discriminated against due to their sex and parental responsibilities. This 
article will use masculinities theory to examine these pioneering lawsuits and 
the precedents they established. Incorporating masculinities literature into the 
work-family scholarship exposes how gender norms construct identity and shape 
workplace structures and practices. While most commentary has focused on the 
effects of these norms on working mothers’ ability to integrate work and 
caregiving, the article shows that these norms also disadvantage fathers, albeit 
in different ways than mothers. 
 After analyzing several of the groundbreaking Israeli and American cases 
in which fathers alleged that they were targets of discrimination, this article 
suggests a reform for courts in both countries. It proposes incorporating 
masculinities theory in sex discrimination cases under a gender anti-
stereotyping doctrine. According to this doctrine, which Israeli and U.S. courts 
have already accepted, penalizing women or men due to gender stereotypes 
might be considered as unlawful sex discrimination. The article then suggests 
pragmatic applications of masculinities theory as part of the stereotyping 
doctrine to be used by plaintiffs and courts adjudicating employment sex 
discrimination cases of male caregivers. 
 
* J.S.D., University of California, Berkeley, 2013; LL.M., University of 
California, Berkeley, 2010; LL.B., Tel-Aviv University, 2004. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In May 2013, the Israeli newspaper Haaretz published an 
article titled Israeli Fathers Who Want it All: But Can They Get a 
Job After Being Stay-at-Home Dads?1 The article discusses the 
obstacles Israeli fathers face when they balance family needs and 
paid employment.2 According to the article, fathers who decide to 
be primary caregivers feel that society regards them as less manly, 
which then affects the ways they view themselves.3 As one of the 
interviewed fathers memorably stated, “Your testosterone is at 
zero, as is your self-esteem.”4 The article further notes that the 
current office norm of working long hours—a norm which I will 
call “the long working hour norm”—does not enable Israeli 
working fathers to take significant part in raising their children,5 a 
similar problem facing their American counterparts.6 
The Haaretz article carries an important message not only 
 
1 Naomi Darom, Israeli Fathers Who Want it All: But Can They Get a Job 
After Being Stay-at-Home Dads?, HAARETZ (May 18, 2013, 1:50 PM), 
http://www.haaretz.com/weekend/magazine/israeli-fathers-who-want-it-all-but-
can-they-get-a-job-after-being-stay-at-home-dads.premium-1.524313. 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 See JANET C. GORNICK & MARCIA K. MEYERS, FAMILIES THAT WORK: 
POLICIES FOR RECONCILING PARENTHOOD AND EMPLOYMENT 59 (2003) 
(discussing the “time squeeze” of American families); see also JOAN C. 
WILLIAMS, RESHAPING THE WORK-FAMILY DEBATE: WHY MEN AND CLASS 
MATTER 90 (2010) [hereinafter WILLIAMS, RESHAPING]; Jerry A. Jacobs & 
Kathleen Gerson, Toward a Family-Friendly, Gender-Equitable Work Week, 1 
U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 457, 458 (1998); Darren Rosenblum, Unsexing 
Mothering, 35 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 57, 107 (2012) (arguing that American 
citizens work a relatively high number of hours per week); Belinda M. Smith, 
Time Norms in the Workplace: Their Exclusionary Effect and Potential for 
Change, 11 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 271, 271 (2002); Joan C. Williams & 
Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family Caregivers Who Are 
Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 77, 114 (2003) 
(arguing that in the current economy, “‘full-time’ frequently means overtime,” 
and “the ideal worker often will leave home at 8 A.M. and not return until 6, 7, or 
even 8 P.M.”); Joan Williams & H.C. Cooper, The Public Policy of Motherhood, 
60 J. SOC. ISSUES 849, 852 (2004). 
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because of its contents, but because it was published in a well-
known national newspaper. Further, the article shifts the discourse 
on the work-family conflict in Israel from a “women’s only” 
problem to an issue that also has a strong impact on men.  
Israeli and American scholars from various disciplines 
typically examine the work-family dilemma by focusing primarily 
on the difficulties working mothers face when trying to balance the 
two spheres.7 The prevailing view has been that women—
especially mothers—suffer when combining family responsibilities 
and market work.8 Accordingly, there have been many important 
legislative and policy efforts in Israel and the U.S. in the last 
several decades to enable women to invest their time and talents in 
spheres other than the domestic one.9 These initiatives have 
 
7 See Lisa Bornstein, Inclusions and Exclusions in Work-Family Policy: 
The Public Values and Moral Code Embedded in the Family and Medical Leave 
Act, 10 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 77, 115–16 (2000); Nancy E. Dowd, Work and 
Family: The Gender Paradox and the Limitations of Discrimination Analysis in 
Restructuring the Workplace, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79, 79 (“Talk about 
work and family is assumed to be women’s talk. It is talk about women’s lives, 
our experiences, our feelings.”); see also MAKING MEN INTO FATHERS: MEN, 
MASCULINITIES AND SOCIAL POLITICS OF FATHERHOOD 25–26 (Barbara Hobson 
ed., 2002) [hereinafter MAKING MEN INTO FATHERS] (arguing that “the focus of 
most theorizing about recent changes in the family has been on women, their 
increased independence, their increased aspirations and their presumed reduced 
dependence on men”); Nancy E. Dowd, Masculinities and Feminist Legal 
Theory, 23 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 201, 241 (2008) [hereinafter Dowd, 
Masculinities and Feminist Legal Theory] (“Typically, feminist evaluation of 
work/family issues and fatherhood has come from the perspective of women or 
predominantly of women.”). An impressive amount of scholarship has been 
written about women’s work-family conflicts.  
8 See Kari Palazzari, The Daddy Double-Bind: How the Family and 
Medical Leave Act Perpetuates Sex Inequality Across All Class Levels, 16 
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 429, 429 (“[T]here has been a great deal of discussion 
in America about work-family conflict or work-life balance. These discussions 
have typically focused on the plight of women, mothers in particular, and the 
inhospitable labor market); see also Haya Stier, The Inter-Relations Between 
Work for Pay and Family Work, 7 SOTSILOGIA YISRAELIT [ISRAELI SOCIOLOGY] 
143, 155 (2005) [Hebrew] (contending that the academic research dealing with 
integrating work and family has emphasized the fact that women have been 
those to make sacrifices when combining the two spheres).  
9 For examples of statutes in Israel, see Employment (Equal Opportunities) 
Law, 5748-1988, SH No. 38 (1998) (Isr.); Male and Female Workers Equal Pay 
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typically emphasized women’s discrimination in the workplace, 
which in many respects remains the focus.10 While women’s 
difficulty juggling work and caregiving responsibilities is worthy 
of such attention and should be resolved, this is only one side of 
the issue: fathers also face significant work-family dilemmas—
which have been under-researched and widely ignored—
particularly in Israel.11  
The primary focus on women’s work-family conflicts hinders 
efforts to promote gender equality in the workplace in both Israel 
and the United States.12 Only when society confronts fathers’ 
 
Law, 5756-1996, SH No. 230 (1996) (Isr.), Male and Female Workers (Equal 
Retirement Age) Law, 5747-1998 (1998) (Isr.). For examples in the United 
States, see Family and Medical Leave Act, Pub. L. No. 103–3, 107 Stat. 6 
(1993); Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95–555, 92 Stat. 2076 
(1978); Equal Pay Act, Pub. L. No. 88–38, 77 Stat. 56 (1963). 
10 See, e.g., MAKING MEN INTO FATHERS, supra note 7, at 25–26.  
11 See Laura T. Kessler, Transgressive Caregiving, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. Rev. 
10 (2005) (contending that men were partially erased “from the discourse of 
family care work within legal feminism”); see also BRAD HARRINGTON ET AL., 
THE NEW DAD: CARING, COMMITTED AND CONFLICTED 36 (2011), available at 
http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/centers/cwf/pdf/FH-Study-Web-2.pdf (last 
modified Wednesday, June 15, 2011) (“Over the past ten years, we have been 
very aware of the serious lack of research that has been done on the experiences 
of working fathers. . . . Precious little time or attention has been invested in 
understanding how men deal with these often competing forces in their lives.”); 
MAKING MEN INTO FATHERS, supra note 7, at 26 (“…the focus of most research 
and theories has been on the ways that women have become more nearly equal 
with men in the sphere of work, with almost no attention to the implications of 
this complexity in men’s parental roles for men’s equality or inequality in the 
sphere of the family”); Kelli K. Garcia, The Gender Bind: Men as Inauthentic 
Caregivers, 20 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 1–2 (2012) (contending that “the 
work-family conflict has been seen through the lens of women’s 
responsibilities” with “almost no discussion of men’s role in family caregiving 
or the conflicts that male caregivers face”). In Israel, see Stier, supra note 8, at 
146 (arguing that while there is a vast amount of literature dealing with the 
implications of family responsibilities on women’s work patterns, a comparable 
discussion with regard to men is almost non-existent). 
12 For example, Catherine Fisk considers the reasons for the persistence of 
the struggle to change the social norms that reinforce gender inequality at the 
workplace. See Catherine Fisk, Foreword: Looking for a Miracle? Women, 
Work, and Effective Legal Change, 13 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 5 (2006). 
Fisk asks whether the law will be able to “change the institutional cultures that 
6 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
difficulties in reconciling work and family can we expect 
workplace norms to be rewritten.  
This article uses masculinities13 theory—a body of theoretical 
and empirical work by feminist theorists, psychologists and 
sociologists—in order to expose stereotypes and gendered biases in 
statutes and court decisions in Israel and in the U.S. Furthermore, 
this article provides the first comparative legal analysis of 
antidiscrimination statutes and case law pertaining to paternal 
work-family integration.  
Only a relatively small number of Israeli and American fathers 
have brought lawsuits alleging they were discriminated against at 
work. This article examines some of these pioneering cases. More 
specifically, it investigates whether Israeli and American working 
fathers faced similar challenges when they went to court. 
Additionally, it examines how judges in both countries have 
perceived male caregivers, workplace norms, and the compatibility 
 
perpetuate women’s subordination.” Id. I argue that by framing the question as 
focusing solely on women, institutional cultures and norms will not change. See 
also Laura T. Kessler, The Attachment Gap: Employment Discrimination Law, 
Women’s Cultural Caregiving, and the Limits of Economic and Liberal Legal 
Theory, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM, 429 (2001) (arguing that “the transformation 
of the male-centered norms that structure the workplace beyond a minimal 
concession to women’s experiences of pregnancy and childbirth has yet to be 
achieved”). I contend that norms of the workplace will change when the focus 
ceases to be merely on women’s issues. 
13 The term “masculinities” is used in the plural form to emphasize that 
masculinity has numerous impressions and multiple meanings. See Dowd, 
Masculinities and Feminist Legal Theory, supra note 7, at 208; see also 
MASCULINITIES AND THE LAW: A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH 28 (Frank 
Rudy Cooper & Ann C. McGinley eds., 2012) [hereinafter MASCULINITIES AND 
THE LAW]; NANCY E. DOWD, THE MAN QUESTION: MALE SUBORDINATION AND 
PRIVILEGE, 26–27 (2010) [hereinafter DOWD, THE MAN QUESTION]; Frank Rudy 
Cooper, “Who’s the Man?”: Masculinities Studies, Terry Stops, and Police 
Training, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 671, 684 (2009) (quoting Paul Smith, 
Introduction to BOYS: MASCULINITIES IN CONTEMPORARY CULTURE 1, 3 (Paul 
Smith ed., 1996).  Yet, I am also aware of the criticism against using that term. 
See, e.g., Douglas P. Schrock and Michael Schwalbe, Men, Masculinity, and 
Manhood Acts, 35 ANN. REV. OF SOC. 277, 280–81 (2009) (criticizing the 
multiple masculinities concept and contending that while such concept 
encourages us to view the differences among men, it also, ironically, promotes a 
categorical essentialism of men). 
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of work and family responsibilities. 
This article asserts that these pioneering cases can play a 
central role in both enhancing gender equality and in undermining 
the long-working-hour norm that dominates many workplaces. It 
also emphasizes the importance of framing male caregivers’ 
lawsuits because this framing can either facilitate or impede social 
change for working parents. It argues that, by incorporating 
masculinities theory into their lawsuits, male caregivers will be 
able to bring legal coherence to their claims and shed light on the 
various ways many men are gendered and disadvantaged.  
The article proceeds as follows. Part I briefly reviews the main 
principles of masculinities theory. Part II examines Israeli 
employment discrimination law and focuses mainly on its 
“parents’ benefits” provision, according to which both women and 
men should be equally permitted to use workplace parental 
benefits (when they are provided). Moreover, the section analyzes 
several cases brought to Israeli labor courts by working fathers 
arguing that they have been illegally denied benefits on the basis of 
sex discrimination. An analysis of the judicial decisions reveals 
common themes pertaining to gender and parental social 
expectations, and employment norms. Part III analyzes four cases 
brought by American caregivers who alleged sex discrimination 
with regard to caregiving responsibilities. An examination of the 
cases, which challenged federal and state statutes and were 
litigated at different time periods, reveals gender stereotypes of 
women and men as caregivers and workers. Part IV elaborates on 
the similarities and differences between masculinity norms in 
Israel and in the U.S. as reflected in the analyzed cases. The 
comparison indicates that gender norms operate in a similar 
manner in both countries, supporting the data that demonstrate 
common conceptions of masculinity in Western societies. 
Finally, Part V proposes pragmatic applications of 
masculinities theory to both litigation and court decisions dealing 
with work-family issues. It attests that masculinities theory can be 
used in sex discrimination cases under the gender anti-stereotyping 
doctrine, which has been adopted by U.S. and Israeli courts for 
several decades. According to this doctrine, penalizing women or 
men at work for deviating from their traditional gender role is 
illegal sex discrimination. Hence, masculinities theory could 
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illuminate the nuances of cultural gender norms and expectations 
and shed light on the penalties that workers face when they fail to 
conform to gender stereotypes. Part VI concludes that 
masculinities theory can further Israeli and American lawyers’ and 
judges’ understanding of the various ways workplace practices 
generate inequality, and hinder men’s ability to be both workers 
and parents. 
 
I. A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO MASCULINITY THEORY 
 
Masculinities scholarship is a cross-disciplinary field of 
research that emerged in the social sciences during the 1970s and 
1980s.14 The theory’s basic premise is that it is not solely women 
but also men who suffer from gender norms and social 
expectations. This body of scholarship evaluates the ways 
masculinity produces power, but also uncovers the disadvantages 
that men experience within patriarchal societies.15  
Masculinities theory consists of several key concepts. The term 
“masculinities” is used in the plural form to emphasize that 
masculinity has various forms and impressions.16 Thus, 
 
14 See MASCULINITIES AND THE LAW, supra note 13, at 1. Masculinities 
research draws mainly from sociology and social psychology, but also from 
psychology, criminology, feminist theory, queer theory, anthropology, and 
geography. See Ann C. McGinley, Work, Caregiving, and Masculinities, 34 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 703, 706 (2011) [hereinafter McGinley, Work, Caregiving, 
and Masculinities]; see also Ann C. McGinley, Ricci v. DeStefano: A 
Masculinities Theory Analysis, 33 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 581, 585 (2010). For 
an overview of the research of major sociologists, see DOWD, THE MAN 
QUESTION, supra note 13, at 28. Note, however, that “scholars in the field 
regularly cross disciplinary lines and include other disciplines as well.” Id. 
15 See MASCULINITIES AND THE LAW, supra note 13, at 4. Masculinities 
studies, thus, expose the assumptions pertaining to manhood and the various 
ways in which such assumptions justify ideas and institutions. See Cooper, 
supra note 13, at 684–85.  
16 See Cooper, supra note 13, at 685 (emphasizing the multiple expressions 
of a masculine behavior by stating that “I personally might emphasize my 
blackness, my heterosexuality, or my being a professor in different contexts in 
order to enact different forms of masculinities.”); see also Dowd, Masculinities 
and Feminist Legal Theory, supra note 7, at 208; see also DOWD, THE MAN 
QUESTION, supra note 13, at 26–27; MASCULINITIES AND THE LAW, supra note 
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masculinities identities are neither fixed nor natural.17 Rather, they 
are a socially constructed set of ideas, manifested through 
performance.18 Since masculinity is a set of practices, it can 
change, and indeed, has changed over time.19 Nevertheless, even 
though there are many ways to express masculinity, not all 
masculinities are equal, and the form of masculinity that is socially 
preferred in any particular culture is called “hegemonic 
masculinity.”20 In the U.S. and Israel, this man should be white, 
upper-middle class, and heterosexual.21 However, “[h]egemonic 
masculinity was not assumed to be normal in the statistical sense; 
only a minority of men might enact it. But it was certainly 
normative.”22 As a result, men are always anxious and insecure 
regarding their manhood,23 which reveals the instability of 
manhood and a constant struggle within men to achieve and 
maintain their manliness.24 As the sociologist Michael Kimmel 
observed, “[w]e are under the constant careful scrutiny of other 
 
13, at 28. But cf. with Schrock and Schwalbe, supra note 13, at 280–81 
(criticizing the multiple masculinities concept and contending that while such 
concept encourages us to view the differences among men, it also, ironically, 
promotes a categorical essentialism of men). 
17 See Richard Collier, Masculinities, Law, and Personal Life: Towards a 
New Framework for Understanding Men, Law, and Gender, 33 HARV. J.L. & 
GENDER 431, 471–72 (2010). 
18 DOWD, THE MAN QUESTION, supra note 13, at 26; McGinley, Work, 
Caregiving, and Masculinities, supra note 14, at 706–07. 
19 See Dowd, Masculinities and Feminist Legal Theory, supra note 7, at 23.  
20 This concept was coined by R.W. Connell, a leading theorist of 
masculinities. See R.W. Connell & James W. Messerschmidt, Hegemonic 
Masculinity: Rethinking the Concept, 19 GENDER & SOC’Y 829, 830–33 (2005). 
21 In Israel, see Einat Hollander, The “New Israeli Man”? Changes in 
Constructions of Masculinity in an Inter-Generational Perspective 65 (2007) 
(unpublished Ph.D Dissertation, Dep’t of Soc. & Anthro., Bar-Ilan University) 
(on file with the Bar-Ilan University Library) [Hebrew]. In the United States, see 
McGinley, Work, Caregiving, and Masculinities, supra note 14, at 586. 
22 See Connell & Messerschmidt, supra note 20 at 832–33.  
23 See Michael S. Kimmel, Masculinity as Homophobia: Fear, Shame, and 
Silence in the Construction of Gender Identity, in TOWARD A NEW PSYCHOLOGY 
OF GENDER: A READER 223, 235 (Mary M. Gergen & Sara N. Davis eds., 1997) 
(“Our efforts to maintain a manly front cover everything we do.”).  
24 See Dowd, Masculinities and Feminist Legal Theory, supra note 7, at 
229; DOWD, THE MAN QUESTION, supra note 13, at 28. 
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men. Other men watch us, rank us, grant our acceptance into the 
realm of manhood. Manhood is demonstrated for other men’s 
approval.”25 Consequently, men compete with each other in order 
to prove their masculinity.26 This feature of male insecurity is 
strongly manifested in the realm of paid work, as will be discussed 
in further details below. Men in Western countries gain their status 
by being breadwinners, a status conferred by their working 
condition and therefore, inherently unstable.27 Masculinities theory 
has also exposed the existence and operation of hierarchies among 
men themselves, especially at the intersections of manhood with 
race, class, and sexual orientation.28 Thus, although men feel 
powerful as a group, they often feel powerless as individuals.29 
According to the legal scholar Nancy Dowd, “[i]t is just as 
important in terms of dismantling male privilege to recognize that 
not all men are similarly situated and that gender privilege may 
even be trumped by another characteristic or by nonconformity to 
gender norms.”30 Therefore, masculinity is about the relationships 
among men, as well as between men and women.31  
Masculinity is defined in opposition to other identity 
categories, specifically femininity and male homosexuality.32 For 
example, acting like “a girl” is regarded as in insult: “To throw like 
a girl, to cry like a girl, to be emotional like a girl, to dress like a 
girl—all of these things are insults, instantly recognizable as 
 
25 See Michael S. Kimmel, Masculinity as Homophobia: Fear, Shame, and 
Silence in the Construction of Gender Identity, in THE GENDER OF DESIRE: 
ESSAYS ON MALE SEXUALITY 25, 33 (2005) (explaining masculinity as a 
homosocial enactment); see also MICHAEL S. KIMMEL, MANHOOD IN AMERICA: 
A CULTURAL HISTORY (1996) (providing a history of U.S. masculinity). 
26 See MASCULINITIES AND THE LAW, supra note 13, at 3. 
27 See JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK 
CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 25 (2000).  
28 Dowd, Masculinities and Feminist Legal Theory, supra note 13, at 229. 
29 See DOWD, THE MAN QUESTION, supra note 13, at 28; MASCULINITIES 
AND THE LAW, supra note 13, at 28–29; Dowd, Masculinities and Feminist 
Legal Theory, supra note 7, at 233. 
30 See Dowd, Masculinities and Feminist Legal Theory, supra note 7, at 
229. 
31 DOWD, THE MAN QUESTION, supra note 13, at 26–28. See also Dowd, 
Masculinities and Feminist Legal Theory, supra note 7, at 209. 
32 See DOWD, THE MAN QUESTION, supra note 13, at 26–28. 
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transgressing what constitutes manhood.”33 Obviously, this 
demand to avoid anything feminine has a strong impact on men as 
caregivers, as being nurturing is socially associated as a women’s 
role. 
One of masculinities studies’ goals is to bring a richer and 
more complex picture of privilege,34 and to show that boys and 
men not only benefit from their gender advantages, but also suffer 
gender harms.35 These harms are evident in several ways. For 
example, male violence is targeted mainly at men;36 boys are 
socialized to deny emotions which negatively affects their 
relationships throughout their lives;37 and the pressure to be 
breadwinner causes stress, leading to potential damage of men’s 
health, which might deteriorate since many refuse to seek care.38 
Furthermore, fathers pay a high price for attaining the breadwinner 
role in the family, since they need to subordinate their relationship 
with their children to wage work.39 
 
33 Nancy E. Dowd, Fatherhood and Equality: Reconfiguring Masculinities, 
45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV, 1047, 1063 (2012) [hereinafter, Dowd, Fatherhood and 
Equality]. 
34 See MASCULINITIES AND THE LAW, supra note 13, at 30; see also 
Schrock and Schwalbe, supra note 13, at 288–89 (claiming that while men as a 
group can benefit from sexist ideology, some “manhood acts can sometimes 
reproduce inequalities in ways that disadvantage subgroups of men”). 
35 See Dowd, Fatherhood and Equality, supra note 33, at 1060; Dowd, 
Masculinities and Feminist Legal Theory, supra note 7, at 204–05; DOWD, THE 
MAN QUESTION, supra note 13, at 70; MASCULINITIES AND THE LAW, supra note 
13, at 4 (asserting that much of masculinities theory “describes the harm that our 
gendered culture does to men”). 
36 MASCULINITIES AND THE LAW, supra note 13, at 29–30. 
37 See Dowd, Masculinities and Feminist Legal Theory, supra note 7, at 
230; Nancy Levit, Feminism for Men: Legal Ideology and the Construction of 
Maleness, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1037, 1062–63 (1996) (claiming that “[f]rom 
infancy, men learn to endure suffering silently and in private. Emotional 
stoicism is ingrained in many and varied ways”); see also MASCULINITIES AND 
THE LAW, supra note 13, at 29.  
38 See Dowd, Masculinities and Feminist Legal Theory, supra note 7, at 
230; see also CHEN NARDI & RIVKA NARDI, MEN IN CHANGE 155–65 (1992) 
[hereinafter NARDI & NARDI] (describing the price paid by modern men and 
suggesting several explanations for the significant differences between men and 
women in terms of health and life expectancy). 
39 See infra Part III.  
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While scholars have increasingly discussed masculinities 
theory, only a few Israeli and American men have attempted to 
litigate discrimination based on caregiving responsibilities. Israeli 
fathers have brought only a handful of cases in which they alleged 
discrimination on the basis of caregiving responsibilities. 
Similarly, the number of lawsuits that American working fathers 
have brought, although growing, remains low.40 There are a 
number of reasons why Israeli and American working fathers 
refrain from litigating their claims: a fear of losing their jobs, 
insufficient evidence, a lack of resources, and so forth.41 Yet, it is 
masculinity norms that greatly undermine working fathers’ ability 
to both acknowledge workplace discrimination and sue their 
employers. 
Israeli and American fathers are normatively expected to be 
primary providers, and they consequently perceive breadwinning 
as their main role as husbands and parents.42 In that sense, 
 
40 Male family responsibility discrimination comprised around fifteen to 
twenty percent of the Center for WorkLife Law’s database. See Joan C. 
Williams & Allison Tait, Mancession or “Momcession”?: Good Providers, a 
Bad Economy, and Gender Discrimination, 86 CHI.–KENT. L. REV. 857, 866 
(2011). Note, however, that this database does not differentiate between 
discrimination against fathers and discrimination against men performing other 
kinds of caregiving, not necessarily for children (care for sick spouses, sick 
parents, etc). See id. Therefore, the number of cases that deal specifically with 
discrimination against working fathers is lower. 
41 See Guy Mundlak, The Law of Equal Opportunities in Employment: 
Between Equality and Polarization, 30 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 213 (2009). 
42 See DOWD, THE MAN QUESTION, supra note 13, at 120; see also Kathryn 
Abrams, Cross-Dressing in the Master’s Clothes, 109 YALE L.J. 745, 759–60 
(2000) (book review) (arguing that the social expectation of men to perform as 
“ideal workers” without family responsibilities arises from pervasive gender 
norms. These norms “link masculinity with the ability to perform as the family 
provider”); MAKING MEN INTO FATHERS, supra note 7, at 62 (arguing that 
“indeed, part of the very definition of proper masculinity, and good fatherhood, 
in the United States has been economic self-support”). With regard to the Israeli 
contexts, see Dror Gershoni, New Fatherhood in Israel—A Gender Perspective 
on Masculinity and Fatherhood in the Institutional and Marital Context 60 
(2004) (unpublished M.A. Thesis, Dep’t of Soc. & Anthro., Bar-Ilan University) 
(on file with the Bar-Ilan University Library) [Hebrew]. Gershoni has 
empirically examined Israeli men’s and women’s assumptions and practices 
regarding fatherhood. Id. at 40. He found that work is an important part of men’s 
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contemporary Israeli and American fathers face similar cultural 
expectations with respect to their paternal duties. Moreover, as 
discussed above, one of the keystone concepts of masculinities 
theory is that manhood is defined through negation—of not being a 
woman or feminine.43 Men, therefore, might reject caregiving 
because “care is perceived as soft, vulnerable, weak—all 
characteristics associated with women, and again, to be rejected, at 
whatever cost by men.”44 As Nancy Dowd aptly contends, “[A]t 
the core of fatherhood, however, is a tension that resonates in the 
contemporary practice of fatherhood. Fatherhood is one of the 
critical life roles for men, but care of children is significantly at 
odds with the concept of masculinity.”45  
Moreover, masculinity norms are constructed by and within 
institutional settings. The workplace, as a major institution of 
modern society, shapes and is shaped by masculinity norms.46 As 
Joan Williams argues, “workplaces are gender factories where men 
forge and enact their masculinity.”47 In particular, the workplace is 
constructed to support the breadwinner norm.48 For example, many 
Israeli and American workplaces compel employees to work an 
exceptional number of hours in comparison with their European 
 
self-definition and their social and self-image. Id. Consequently, he has 
demonstrated that the very definition of fatherhood is done in the context of 
work. Id. 
43 See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text. 
44 Dowd, Fatherhood and Equality, supra note 33, at 1063. 
45 DOWD, THE MAN QUESTION, supra note 13, at 105. 
46 See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF 
THE STATE 224 (1989); Joan Acker, Hierarchies, Jobs, Bodies: A Theory of 
Gendered Organizations, 4 GENDER & SOC’Y 139 (1990); Kathryn Abrams, 
Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. 
L. REV. 1183 (1989); Catherine Albiston, Institutional Inequality, 2009 WIS. L. 
REV. 1093 [hereinafter Albiston, Institutional Inequality]; McGinley, Work, 
Caregiving, and Masculinities, supra note 14, at 708; Williams and Tait, supra 
note 40, at 875 (contending that “the workplace culture is male-dominated and 
defined by norms of extreme masculinity”); WILLIAMS, RESHAPING, supra note 
6, at 88. 
47 WILLIAMS, RESHAPING, supra note 6, at 88. 
48 See Dowd, Fatherhood and Equality, supra note 33, at 1061–63 
(contending that “[t]here is no doubt that the breadwinner norm powerfully 
infuses the structure and culture of the workplace”). 
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counterparts.49 The long working hour norm is especially prevalent 
in professional and managerial positions,50 yet more and more 
workplaces have come to adopt that norm.51 
The long working hour norm forces workers to devote most of 
their time and energy to work and thus perpetuates gendered 
patterns of care. Since men usually earn more than women in Israel 
and in the U.S.,52 couples in both countries might decide that it is 
 
49 See GORNICK & MEYERS, supra note 6, at 59 (discussing the “time 
squeeze” of American families). In comparison, the law in Israel defines that a 
working week is approximately 40 hours a week. Hours of Work and Rest Law, 
5711-1951 (1951) (providing that “[a] working week shall not exceed forty-five 
working hours”). Despite this law, many Israelis work 60 hours a week or more. 
Nir Hasson, Experts: Israelis Among Most Overworked People in World, 
HAARETZ (Feb. 24, 2009 3:18 AM), http://www.haaretz.com/print-
edition/news/experts-israelis-among-most-overworked-people-in-world-
1.270790. This, of course, puts pressure on Israeli families. See, e.g., Darom, 
supra note 1 (“For many workers, though, there simply aren’t enough hours in 
the day to successfully combine a high-pressure job with family duties – a 
quandary with deep roots in the Israeli labor market.”). 
50 See Belinda M. Smith, Time Norms in the Workplace: Their 
Exclusionary Effect and Potential for Change, 11 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 271, 
277 (2002) (asserting that “[l]ong weeks, however, are still most common 
among professional workers and managers”); see also WILLIAMS, supra note 6, 
at 90 (contending that “Americans now work longer hours than workers in most 
other developed countries” and that “American elites work longer hours than 
other Americans.”). In Israel, see Arianne Renan-Barzilay, Working Parents: 
Multidimensionalism and Working-Class Social Feminism – A New Theoretical 
Framework for Reconciling Work and Family in Israel , 35 TEL AVIV UNIV. L. 
REV. 310, 327 (2012) (arguing that many of the available positions in the Israeli 
job market – certainly the most rewarding of these jobs – are irrelevant to those 
who have other responsibilities).  
51 See Erin L. Kelly, Discrimination Against Caregivers? Gendered Family 
Responsibilities, Employer Practices, and Work Rewards, in Handbook Of 
Employment Discrimination Research: Rights And Realities 341, 350 (Laura 
Beth Nielsen & Robert Nelson eds., 2005); see also Smith, supra note 50, at 277 
(asserting that “[s]uch long employment weeks are no longer restricted to a few 
occupations, but are filtering across a range of occupations and extending down 
the corporate hierarchy). In Israel, see Renan Barzilay, supra note 50, at 327 
(arguing that more and more employment/labor sectors in Israel adopt the long 
hour norms and view the “ideal worker” as one who works long hours). 
52 See Dowd, Fatherhood and Equality, supra note 33, at 1069. In Israel, 
see Darom, supra note 1 (“[W]omen make up some 50 percent of all employees 
in the workplace here, and the percentage of working women in Israel is among 
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economically justified for the woman to take care of the domestic 
responsibilities and thus take family leave when needed, work part 
time, or leave the workforce altogether. Consequently, the 
breadwinner model is reinforced, as fathers are required to fulfill 
their economic responsibilities, and are thus dissuaded from 
providing care.  
 
II. CARE TO SUE: ISRAELI WORKING FATHERS STRUGGLE TO 
COMBINE WORK AND CAREGIVING 
 
This Part analyzes the “Parents’ Benefits” provision in the 
Israeli employment antidiscrimination law and the lawsuits 
brought by working fathers alleging they were illegally denied 
these benefits. These cases were unusual in the sense that men 
were the ones who brought suits claiming they had been 
discriminated against at work due to their sex and parental 
responsibilities, and asked to secure parental rights in order to 
integrate work and family. Therefore, analyzing the national and 
regional labor court decisions allows for a unique opportunity to 
examine courts’ views about gender stereotypes as well as social 
norms pertaining to work, family, and working parents’ ability to 
integrate the two. 
 
A. The Legal Basis - Employment Antidiscrimination Law 
 
The Employment Equal Opportunities Law (hereinafter: EEO 
law) was enacted in 1988 to fight discrimination in the Israeli 
workplace. The law provides that an employer is prohibited from 
discriminating against workers based on the following 
characteristics: gender, sexual orientation, marital status, 
pregnancy, fertility treatments, IVF treatments, parenthood, race, 
age, religion, nationality, country of birth, political or other 
orientation, or army service.53 The prohibition—which covers both 
 
the world’s highest. Women also receive more higher education than men. And 
yet, the wage gap between men and women has remained steady  (at about 30 
percent ) for decades.”). 
53 Employment (Equal Opportunities) Law, 5748-1988, SH No. 38, § 2(a) 
[hereinafter EEO Law]. 
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private and public employers—applies to hiring, work conditions, 
promotion, training, termination, and retirement.54 A violation of 
the law is considered a criminal offense with a high monetary 
penalty, and also awards civil remedies.55 Labor courts have the 
sole authority to deal with disputes arising from this law.56 
Aside from prohibiting discrimination against parents, the law 
also includes an affirmative provision entitled “Parents’ 
Benefits.”57 At first the law only applied to working mothers, but it 
was amended in 1995 to include fathers as well.58 The EEO law 
does not create additional benefits, but rather requires that if one or 
more benefits have been customary for mothers at a workplace, it 
should also be equally available to fathers at that workplace. The 
closed list of parental benefits includes:  
(1)  absence from work due to child’s illness; 
(2)  a shortened working day because a female  
employee is the mother of a child; 
(3)  the right to use the services of an on-site 
employer-provided day care center; 
(4)  the employer’s contribution to the cost of keeping 
a child in a daycare center.59 
The law, however, differentiates between working mothers’ 
and working fathers’ eligibility for the benefits that are customary 
at their workplaces. While a working mother is eligible for the 
benefits without further conditions, a working father must prove 
 
54 Id. § 2(a)(1)–(6). 
55 Id. §§ 10, 15. 
56 Id. § 10. Appeals go to the National Labor Court. Under special 
circumstances it is possible to file a petition to the Supreme Court, and the Court 
will agree to hear the case only if (1) there is a legal mistake in the decision of 
the National Labor Court, and (2) if deciding the case serves justice. See Nabil 
Hatib v. The National Labor Court, 40(1) PD 673 (1986) (Supreme Court of 
Israel). 
57 EEO Law § 4. 
58 Id. § 4(a). Section 4(a) states that “[w]here, in accordance with the terms 
of employment customary at her place of work, a woman employee has any 
entitlement by virtue of her being a parent, such entitlement shall also be 
accorded to a male employee at the workplace where the aforesaid term of 
employment is customary . . . .” Id.  
59 Id. § 4(b)(1)–(4). 
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that (1) his spouse is gainfully employed rather than working as a 
housewife; and (2) his spouse has not already used the benefit 
herself.60 Therefore fathers—but not mothers—must prove that 
their spouses work in order to be eligible for the abovementioned 
benefits. Thus, in cases where the mother is unemployed, her 
spouse will not be entitled to the abovementioned benefits. 
However, in the opposite scenario, when the mother works and the 
father is unemployed, the mother would still be entitled to benefits. 
Hinging the father’s ability to use parental benefits upon the 
mother’s work status but not the other way around reflects the 
legislature’s presumption that fathers work (or should work), and 
that there is therefore no need for a mother to prove that her 
husband works. This criterion demonstrates the social demand of 
men to be breadwinners. Furthermore, not hinging the mother’s 
ability to use parental benefits upon the father’s work status 
demonstrates the legislature’s assumption that regardless of her 
husband’s work status, it is the mother’s responsibility to take care 
of the children.  
The provision imposes another eligibility criterion upon fathers 
who want to use the benefit. Besides showing that his spouse 
works, the father will have to prove that his spouse is formally 
entitled to the benefit at her workplace (and has not used it).61 This 
requirement does not exist for mothers, and a mother can use the 
entitlement if it is customary in her own workplace alone. The 
labor courts were required to deliberate this problematic and rather 
odd demand.62 
The following section will focus on the Israeli labor court 
decisions regarding a father’s ability to work a shortened day when 
he has young children. An analysis of these cases will show that 
 
60 Section 4(a)(1) of the EEO Law states that in order to be eligible for 
benefits, a father must prove: “(1) his spouse is an employee and she has not 
been absent from her work by virtue of her said right in subsection (b)(l) or (2) 
and has not claimed the right to such entitlement as provided in subsection 
(b)(3) or (4).” Id. § 4(a)(1). Fathers who have sole custody of their children are 
eligible for the right if it exists in their own workplace. See id. § 4(a)(2). 
61 Section 4(a)(1) states that “his spouse is an employee and she has not 
been absent from her work by virtue of her said right . . . and has not claimed 
the right to such entitlement . . . .” Id. (emphasis added).  
62 See discussion infra Part II.B. 
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while the courts have interpreted the law in an expansive way to 
afford fathers the benefit, the judges’ rationales actually 
undermined significant father care.   
 
B. The Earliest Cases – Interpreting Fathers’ Benefit to a 
Shortened Working Day 
 
The first two employment discrimination suits that fathers 
brought dealt with the interpretation of EEO law § 4(a)(2), which 
addresses parents’ eligibility to work a shortened day.63 Both cases 
involved fathers who worked for the civil service sector, where 
mothers are entitled to work an hour less if they have children 
younger than thirteen years old. The plaintiffs’ spouses, however, 
who worked in different workplaces, were not eligible for the 
benefit. The first case, Yahav v. State of Israel,64 which the 
Regional Labor Court of Tel-Aviv decided in 1999, involved a 
father whose wife was self-employed. The plaintiff argued that 
since his wife finished work around 7 PM, he needed to be home 
earlier to take care of his children, who were younger than 
thirteen.65 The second case, Moscolenco v. State of Israel,66 which 
the Regional Labor Court of Be’er-Sheva decided in 2002, 
involved a father whose wife was ineligible for the shortened 
workday benefit in her own workplace. In both cases, the state 
alleged that the fathers were not entitled to the right since their 
spouses were not entitled to it—the first wife was self-employed, 
and the second did not have the benefit in her workplace. The 
employer’s refusal to allow fathers to use parental benefits 
demonstrates the obstacles men encounter at work when they 
“deviate” from their stereotypical masculine role of providers. 
Interestingly, although the plaintiffs were fathers who sought 
parental benefits, their arguments were not about their obligation to 
 
63 EEO law § 4(a)(2).   
64 File No. 031993/96 Labor Court (Tel Aviv-Jaffa [TA]), Yahav v. Medi-
nat Israel [Yahav v. State of Israel] (Nov. 25, 1999), Nevo Legal Database (by 
subscription).
65 Id. §§ 2–3.  
66 File No. 001277/01 Labor Court (Be’er-Sheva [BS]), Moscolenco v. 
Mishteret Israel [Moskolenko v. Israel Police] (Mar. 24, 2002), Nevo Legal 
Database (by subscription). 
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raise their children but about discrimination against working 
mothers. This strategy is not surprising given the lack of social 
support for fathers as nurturers and caregivers. Therefore, the 
plaintiffs’ lawyers had surmised that the courts would be more 
receptive to the argument that mothers had been discriminated 
against at work than the argument that fathers wanted to be 
involved as caregivers. For example, in Yahav, the plaintiff 
contended that denying fathers the ability to a shortened workday 
was a forbidden discrimination since “it [wa]s based upon the 
stereotype according to which a woman’s primary role is 
housekeeping and caregiving, and her work outside the house has 
minor importance.”67 Likewise, the Moscolenco plaintiff argued 
that the defendant’s refusal to allow him to use his parental benefit 
“perpetuate[d] traditional feminine stereotypes.”68  
In both cases, the regional labor courts decided in favor of the 
plaintiffs. In Yahav, the court stated that in order to fulfill the law’s 
goal of creating substantive gender equality, fathers would be 
entitled to the benefit even if their partners were self-employed.69 
Similarly, in Moscolenco, the court decided that a father would be 
eligible for the benefit even if his partner was not entitled to it in 
her own workplace.70  
In both cases the state appealed to the National Labor Court, 
and in both appeals the court affirmed the regional courts’ 
holdings. According to the National Court in Yahav, the EEO law 
is “a law aiming at fulfilling one of the fundamental principles of 
any legal system in a developed state, which is the equality 
principle.”71 Consequently, the court stated that the law should be 
interpreted in an expansive way that allows fathers with self-
 
67 Yahav v. State of Israel, Labor Court TA § 8(h); see also id. §8(o) 
(arguing that denying fathers whose wives are self-employed “hurts the equal 
opportunities of women in the workplace, especially in senior positions, and 
reinforces the stereotype according to which a woman’s main role is taking care 
of the house and children while her work outside the home is secondary to her 
‘domestic roles’”).  
68 Moscolenco v. State of Israel, Labor Court BS, § 15.   
69 Yahav v. State of Israel, Labor Court TA § 14.  
70 Moscolenco v. State of Israel, Labor Court BS, § 37.   
71 NLC 1039/00 Medinat Israel v. Yahav [State of Israel v. Yahav] 38 Piske 
Din Avoda [PDA] 26, 34 [2002]. 
20 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
employed spouses to receive the benefit.72 Similarly, in 
Moscolenco, the court ruled that as long as the mother works and 
has not used the benefit, the father would be eligible to it, 
regardless of whether or not the mother is entitled to the benefit 
herself.73 In conclusion, the court determined that fathers can 
receive the benefit if they fulfill two conditions: first, their female 
colleagues who have children are eligible for the benefit; and 
second, their spouse works (either as an employee or self-
contractor) and has not used the benefit herself.74  
The dissent in both cases would have overturned the lower 
courts based on a literal interpretation of the EEO law § 4(a)(2) 
provision. According to their interpretation, the legislature 
intended for the father to be eligible for the benefit only if his 
spouse was an employee and not self-employed,75 and only if the 
employed mother was entitled to the benefit in her own 
workplace.76 The majority judges addressed this issue, and stated 
that the law is not unequivocal but rather bears a broad meaning 
and could also be applied in cases where the spouse is self-
employed,77 or herself ineligible for the benefit.78 According to the 
dissenting opinions, the majorities interpreted the law according to 
its desire to promote employment equality.79 
The National Labor Court expanded the law to create a society 
in which the husband of a self-employed mother is still entitled to 
parenthood benefits.80 Moreover, even if his spouse is not entitled 
to the benefit at her workplace, the father will nevertheless receive 
the benefit, as long as it is given to mothers at his workplace.81  
 
72 Id. at 36. 
73 NLC 1155/02 Medinat Israel v. Moscolenco [State of Israel v. 
Moscolenco] 39 PDA 337 [2003]. 
74 State of Israel v. Moskolenko, 39 PDA at 347; State of Israel v. Yahav  38 
PDA at 36. 
75 State of Israel v. Yahav, 38 PDA at 33–34 (Tenenboim, J. dissenting). 
76 State of Israel v. Moscolenco, 39 PDA at 347 (Tzur, J. dissenting). 
77 Yahav, 38 PDA at 32.  
78 Moscolenco, 39 PDA at 346–47. 
79 Yahav, 38 PDA at 33; Moscolenco, 39 PDA at 346. 
80 Yahav, 38 PDA at 26. 
81 Moscolenco, 39 PDA 337. Following these decisions, the Takshir, which 
is the collection of regulations and orders applicable to the Civil Service, was 
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Although the courts expansively interpreted the law in a way 
that allows more fathers to use parental benefits, strengthening 
father care was not the courts’ purpose. An examination of the 
decisions reveals that their reasoning focused on neither fathers nor 
children but rather on mothers and their ability to attain gender 
equality in the workplace.  
An analysis of the main themes of the decisions sheds light on 
the judges’ (rather problematic) views of gender, parental 
responsibilities, and work-family balance. First, the courts favor a 
narrow view of gender equality, according to which equality is 
achieved when mothers get the ability to work long hours, and not 
when both genders have the equal ability to integrate work and 
family effectively. Second, the courts ignore that men have 
responsibilities to their families and instead regard fathers’ 
involvement in raising children as voluntary. Third, the courts’ 
reasoning reinforces the prevailing workplace norm that more 
work is better work. Combined, these three flaws in reasoning do 
not serve to question gendered notions of breadwinning or 
caregiving responsibilities. In fact, the courts’ flawed reasoning 
does nothing but make it more difficult for workers of both 
genders to achieve a balance between work and family life.  
 
1. Substantive Equality vs. Formal Equality  
 
Significant parts of the decisions were devoted to the courts’ 
interpretations of gender equality, and the courts were faced with 
the option of promoting formal equality—where both genders are 
entitled to equal access to work, meaning long working hours—
and substantive equality—where both genders have equal ability to 
 
amended. See Shmuel Holland, Notice No. 64/17, Parental Rights – Amendment, 
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (Feb. 2, 2004), http://csc.gov.il//DataBases/ 
NashamPosts/Documents/tashad17.rtf. The new provision explicitly states that a 
working father will be entitled to a parental right, regardless of whether his 
spouse is an employee or self-employed, and regardless of whether her 
workplace provides parental rights or not. Civil Service Regulations, 2004, 
§35.112, available at http://www.csc.gov.il/Takshir/terms/Documents/takshir30-
6-2014.pdf. In addition, the EEO law was changed in 2011 to provide that a 
father with a self-employed wife would be entitled to the right (if his wife had 
not used the right herself). EEO Law, § 4(a)(1), amend. 17. 
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balance work and family.82 The courts chose the former. 
According to the judges, fathers should be entitled to shorten their 
workdays so that mothers can extend theirs. In the court’s 
language: “We chose an expansive interpretation [of the law] in 
order to enable as many working women as possible to extend their 
working hours without hurting their children.”83 The courts 
emphasized the importance of the law vis-a-vis women’s ability to 
work more,84 not men’s ability to provide care more:  
The purpose of the law is to promote the working 
woman, whether she works as an employee or self-
employed, in order to put her on the same starting 
line with working men. The purpose of the law is to 
give equal opportunity for a woman and a man to 
obtain the same work and to carry out that work 
successfully even if it involves working long 
hours.85 
Thus, in order to promote gender equality, the judges 
encourage women to work as many hours as men. This kind of 
logic has been at the center of many policies aimed at enhancing 
women’s equality at the workplace.86 According to this formalistic 
logic, gender employment inequality will be resolved when women 
adapt to men’s working patterns, and consequently gain economic 
parity with men.87  
By encouraging women to work men’s longer hours, however, 
the courts did not promote substantive gender equality. Instead, the 
 
82  See File No. 031993/96 Labor Court (TA), Yahav v. State of Israel 
(Nov. 25, 1999), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) § 13(B) (“Our ambition 
is to interpret the law in a way which will accomplish its goals of creating 
substantive equality between a man and a woman . . . .”).  
83 Yahav v. Israel, Labor Court (TA), § 13(c) (translation by author). 
84 See Mordehai (Moti) Mironi, Work, Family, and the Law in Israel, 27 
COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 487, 506 (2006) (arguing that in the Yahav and 
Moscolenco cases the National Labor Court “emphasized that the purpose of the 
amendment was to ease the stress working mothers experience due to family 
obligations and to enhance their chance for development and self-actualization 
at work”). 
85  Yahav v. Israel, Labor Court (TA), § 13(d).  
86 See Stier, supra note 8, at 23.  
87 Id. 
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courts made it more difficult for parents—mothers as well as 
fathers—to be both workers and parents. By emphasizing the need 
for women to adhere to the long-working-hour norm in order to 
achieve workplace success, the courts encouraged role switching 
only in certain cases—where women work long hours and men 
return home early to care for children. The courts’ formalist 
approach to equality did nothing to deconstruct the separate 
spheres. Furthermore, in strengthening women’s ability to work 
longer hours at the expense of spending time with their families, 
the courts implicitly prioritized work over family.88 The courts’ 
deference to the “work” side of the “work/family” equation reflects 
an ideological hierarchy between the public and the private—one 
where the public sphere is more appreciated and respected than the 
private one.89 
 
2. The Role of Fathers and Their (In)Ability to Integrate 
Work and Family  
 
While the two cases dealt with fathers’ ability to combine work 
and caregiving, there was no reference to either the importance of 
paternal care or to men’s obligations as fathers. According to the 
Yahav court, actively raising children is less a paternal obligation 
than a matter of fathers’ good will: “This woman, whose husband 
is willing to return home early and care for the children, can invest 
time and resources in her work and career, without feeling that she 
is neglecting her children.”90 Further, the Moscalenco court stated 
that “There are men who are willing to carry the burden of the 
family in an equal or different way than their partners and are 
willing to allow them to launch a career . . . .”91 Mothers and 
fathers were thus “gender-policed” by the courts: it is a mother’s 
duty to raise her children, but if she is “lucky” enough, her 
 
88  Some courts referred to family responsibilities and child rearing as “a 
burden.” See, e.g., State of Israel v. Yahav 38 PDA 26, 35 (2002); Moscolenco 
v. Israel Police, Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) § 36.  
89 See Stier, supra note 8, at 24. 
90 Yahav v. Israel, Labor Court (TA), § 13(c). 
91 Moscolenco v. Israel Police, ¶ 35. 
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husband will “carry the burden of the family”92 with her. 
Moreover, she can launch a career if he is “willing” to allow her to 
do so. The courts’ view is typical, as fathers’ involvement in 
raising their children is usually constructed as voluntary rather than 
as part of their identity as men.93 Furthermore, as masculinities 
theory has shown, caregiving is in conflict with the concept of 
masculinity,94 which means that fathers who want to be involved in 
raising their children might impugn their masculine façade. 
Along these lines, the courts characterized fathers who worked 
fewer hours in order to raise their children as rare men who gave 
up their careers: “In our society, a man who returns home early and 
cares for his children, a man who is willing to give up his career 
while his wife succeeds in her work, is not common.”95 Let us 
recall that the plaintiffs asked that their working day be reduced by 
merely one hour so they could rush home to be with their 
children—and for the courts, even such a minor reduction was 
regarded as giving up a career. (Is it only incidental that men have 
“a career” while women have “work”?). This view emphasizes the 
overlap between masculinities and work,96 or, more accurately, 
between masculinities and a total commitment to work.97 The 
courts reinforce the breadwinner norm—the notion that the main 
paternal responsibility is providing economically for their families. 
Moreover, the courts could not have imagined that the plaintiffs’ 
motive for reducing their working day was their desire to be more 
involved parents.  
The courts’ underlying perception is that being a breadwinner 
 
92 Id. 
93 See Dowd, Fatherhood and Equality, supra note 33, at 1061–62. 
94 DOWD, THE MAN QUESTION, supra note 13, at 105. 
95  Yahav v. Israel, Labor Court (TA), § 13(d). 
96 See Dowd, Fatherhood and Equality, supra note 33, at 1060–62. Dowd 
argued that “those men who would choose to care more, to engage more with 
their families, may worry about the perception that they are not serious or 
devoted to work, or that their interest in care makes them less manly (and by 
definition, less of an ideal worker).” Id. 
97 I would like to thank Professor Kathryn Abrams for this observation. See 
also Abrams, supra note 42, at 760 (contending that “a growing body of 
scholarship suggests a far more complicated relationship between masculinity 
and the provider status associated with primary commitment to market work”). 
 DARE TO CARE 25
is a privilege while adhering to family responsibilities is a burden. 
Therefore, fathers who work less are seen as sacrificing their 
careers for their wives. On the other hand, men who work many 
hours are not seen as fathers who are sacrificing their families.   
 
3. Reinforcement of Workplace Norms 
 
Another theme that arises in both Yahav and Moscolenco 
pertains to work practices, particularly many employers’ 
requirements to work long hours. According to the courts, working 
extra hours, attending meetings at late hours, and staying at the 
office “as much as the position demands”98 are all legitimate 
employer requirements.99 By calling these requirements “the 
position’s demands” and “the position and its constraints,”100 the 
courts reaffirmed restrictive work practices and insulated them 
from challenge. Moreover, by implicitly approving the demand to 
work long hours, the courts reinforced the view that work quality is 
correlated with the number of hours worked. However, studies 
have shown that such an assumption is mistaken, and there is not a 
correlation between hours worked and productivity.101 
Furthermore, linking long work hours and success at work ignores 
the reality of many workers who are required to work long hours 
not in order to succeed at work, but merely to keep it.102 Such a 
survival mode becomes the operating norm at their workplaces.  
In conclusion, these cases had the potential to challenge 
workplace norms while emphasizing that both working fathers and 
working mothers need to fulfill family responsibilities. The courts 
 
98  Yahav v. Israel, Labor Court (TA), § 13(d). 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 See Catherine Albiston & Shelley Correll, Op–Ed., Benefit of Office 
Face Time a Myth, CNN (March 13, 2013, 10:51 PM), http://www.cnn.com/ 
2013/03/13/opinion/albison-correll-women-face-time/index.html?iref=allsearch. 
102 See generally Jodi Kantor, Working Anything but 9 to 5: Scheduling 
Technology Leaves Low-Income Parents With Hours of Chaos, N.Y. TIMES 
(August 13, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/08/13/us/ 
starbucks-workers-scheduling-hours.html (discussing employment hardships 
low-income parents face, including unwillingness to request stabilized hours out 
of fear of losing employment). 
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squandered this opportunity to encourage social change when they 
accepted the aforementioned workplace requirements as inevitable 
and justified. The courts could have encouraged the rare fathers 
who had fought for the ability to work without sacrificing family 
involvement. Instead, workplace norms that reinforce the inability 
of parents to integrate work and caregiving pervade these opinions. 
The decisions, in effect, proclaim that in order to succeed at work 
one has to give up family life. While it has been common for men 
to work longer hours and practically sacrifice their family lives, the 
courts now encourage women to do the same and, in that sense, 
emulate men.  
 
C.   An Expansion of the Shortened Working Day Benefit: 
Monetary Benefits for Parents 
 
Working fathers have also litigated cases involving how their 
parental status affects their eligibility for monetary benefits. Some 
collective bargaining agreements have accorded working mothers 
monetary benefits under certain conditions. Fathers at the same 
workplaces have argued that allowing only mothers to receive 
these benefits constitutes unlawful sex discrimination. However, 
section 3(b) of the EEO law indicates specifically that if employed 
women are accorded employment privileges “by any enactment, 
collective bargaining agreement or contract of employment,” these 
privileges should not be regarded as discrimination against men.103 
Therefore, the state claimed that these monetary benefits were a 
privilege for mothers as part of affirmative action on their behalf 
and thus should not be considered discrimination against men. 
Several fathers working as teachers have challenged a specific 
provision in their collective bargaining agreement. This provision 
provided an addendum to the salary of part-time mother-teachers 
with children under the age of fourteen.104 Widowers and divorced 
 
103 Employment (Equal Opportunities) Law, 5748-1988, SH No. 38 § 3(b) 
(“This Law shall not derogate from any privilege granted to a female employee 
by any enactment, collective [bargaining] agreement or contract of employment 
and such a privilege shall not be regarded as discrimination.”).   
104 See File No. 300301/97 Labor Court (Be’er-Sheva), Sa’adon v. Medinat 
Israel [Sa’adon v. State of Israel] (Sept. 30, 2001), Nevo Legal Database (by 
subscription) § 5 (quoting provisions 63a and 62 of the Collective Agreement of 
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fathers who raised their children were also entitled to the monetary 
benefit.105 However, the collective bargaining agreement did not 
mention married fathers who were teachers, and the courts had to 
decide whether such fathers were also eligible for the benefits. The 
regional labor courts decided in favor of several father-plaintiffs 
who challenged the agreement. Nevertheless, on appeals, the 
National Labor Court reversed these decisions and established 
binding precedents for similar future cases. 
In Saadon v. State of Israel, decided in 2001, a father-teacher 
with children under the age of five asked to get the same 10% 
addendum to his salary that mother-teachers get.106 The Regional 
Labor Court of Be’er-Sheva decided in favor of the plaintiff. It 
interpreted the collective bargaining agreement in light of the EEO 
law, and declared that the benefit to work a shortened day could 
also encompass receiving monetary benefits.107 Several years later, 
in the Levi and Shterenlib cases, other father-teachers asked to 
receive the same benefit.108 Apparently, the state had not abided by 
the prior court’s ruling and failed to give the benefit to father-
teachers.109 The Regional Labor Courts of Haifa and Tel-Aviv 
decided in favor of the plaintiffs and virtually reaffirmed the 
Saadon ruling.110  
In 2008, the Regional Labor Court of Jerusalem decided in 
favor of another father who argued he was discriminated against at 
work. In Dan Bahat v. State of Israel, the court interpreted a 
collective bargaining agreement provision involving working 
 
Teachers). According to provision 63a, mothers will receive an addendum of 
10% to their salary if they work between 79% and 90%, and an upgrade to full 
pay if they work between 91% and 100%. According to provision 62, a mother-
teacher will be eligible for an extra payment for her childcare expenses if her 
children are less than 5 years old. If her employer gives a discount for childcare, 
she can choose between the extra payment and the discount). 
105 Id. 
106 Id. § 1. 
107 Id. § 6. 
108 Haifa Labor Court 570/05 Levi et. al v. State of Israel (Unpublished 
8.19.08); Tel-Aviv Labor Court 6271/06 Shterenlib v. State of Israel 
(Unpublished 8.5.09). 
109 Levi et. al v. State of Israel §§ 53–57;  Shterenlib v. State of Israel § 28. 
110 Levi et. al v. State of Israel, § 45; Shterenlib v. State of Israel, § 21. 
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mothers in the civil service.111 According to the provision, working 
mothers were entitled to a shortened workday. Nevertheless, in 
cases where they were required to stay longer hours at work, they 
would be “compensated” and get an addendum to their salary.112 
The plaintiff, Dan Bahat, a father working as a state attorney, 
claimed that he was discriminated against: He claimed that 
although he stayed beyond the shortened day, he did not receive 
extra payment, whereas his female colleagues were entitled to the 
addendum in the same situation.113 The court decided in favor of 
the plaintiff, stating that not paying fathers for extra hours, while 
paying them to mothers, constituted prohibited discrimination 
against fathers.114 The court rejected the affirmative action 
argument, and stated that since working fathers are similarly 
situated to working mothers, this affirmative action for working 
mothers constituted discrimination against the working fathers’ 
group.115  
Yet, the National Labor Court had a different view as it 
overturned all the above-mentioned regional labor court decisions, 
as will be discussed below. 
 
D.   Discrimination against Men or Affirmative Action for 
Women: An Analysis of the National and Regional Labor 
Courts Rulings 
 
The national and regional labor courts were presented with the 
question: is giving mothers monetary benefits part of affirmative 
action for mothers, and therefore justified (as the defendant 
claimed), or a discrimination against fathers (as the plaintiffs 
asserted)? While the regional labor courts decided in favor of the 
father-plaintiffs, the National Labor Court later reversed the 
 
111  File No. 2456/03 Labor Court (Jerusalem), Bahat v. Medinat Israel 
Misrad HaMishpatim [Bahat v. State of Israel] (May 5, 2008), Database Name 
(by subscription) § 23. 
112 Id. § 10. 
113 Id. § 12. 
114 Id. § 40. 
115 Id. § 37. 
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decisions and established binding precedents for similar future 
cases. According to the National Labor Court, the monetary benefit 
is part of an affirmative action for women and, therefore, fathers 
are ineligible for it. However, despite the opposite results, both the 
national and regional labor courts’ rationales are quite similar in 
that they encourage mothers to work as “ideal workers” in order to 
attain gender equality. For example, in Saadon, Levi, and 
Shterenlib,, which dealt with father-teachers’ eligibility for 
monetary benefits, the regional labor courts decided that both 
fathers and mothers are entitled to monetary benefits. The courts 
rejected the state’s claims that such a benefit was an affirmative 
action since the purpose of affirmative action was to change unfair 
norms in society, such as the idea that only women take care of 
children.116 However, allowing only mothers to work less and 
receive full payment in effect reinforced stereotypes of women as 
primarily caregivers: 
The result would be that a teacher-mother will work 
less that way. In fact, it would be hard for her to 
compete with her male colleagues who work longer 
hours and may progress and climb the job ladder, 
leaving her to take care of the children and the 
house.117 
Similar to the decisions discussed in the previous section,118 the 
judges in these cases focused on the issue of hours and the 
importance of mothers working longer if they wanted to be as 
successful as men. Notice that, according to the courts, even 
teachers are evaluated by the number of hours they work, and 
mother-teachers should extend their working hours in order to 
attain parity with their male colleagues.   
On appeal in Levi, the National Labor Court rejected the father-
teachers’ claims, and asserted that withholding monetary benefits 
 
116  File No. 300301/97 Labor Court (Be’er-Sheva), Sa’adon v. Medinat 
Israel [Sa’adon v. State of Israel] (Sept. 30, 2001), Nevo Legal Database (by 
subscription) § 13; National Labor Court [NLC] 547/08 Medinat Israel v. Levi 
Shlomo [State of Israel v. Levi] (Feb. 27, 2013), Nevo Legal Database (by 
subscription) § 45. 
117 Sa’adon v. State of Israel § 13. 
118 See Part B. 
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from fathers was permissible.119 According to Judge Arad, 
President of the Court: 
[T]he essence of the monetary benefit as “mother’s 
prerogative” is to encourage working mothers to 
stay at work for long hours in order to fulfill job 
demands. In this way of promoting mother-
teachers’ status and salary, the goal of establishing 
substantive equality between mother-teachers and 
father-teachers is achieved.120  
Similarly, on appeal in Dan Bahat, decided in 2010, the 
National Labor Court overturned the Regional Labor Court’s 
ruling and decided that fathers are only eligible for shortened 
workdays, not to additional pay if they work longer hours during 
these days.121 The court differentiated between fathers and mothers 
regarding the right to receive an extra pay because “[t]he desirable 
legal policy . . . is to give women additional incentives in order to 
encourage them to stay and work long hours and equalize their 
status at work to men’s status.”122 The court reasoned that since 
men usually earn more than women, men do not need the monetary 
benefit.123 Moreover, according to the court, if fathers receive such 
a monetary benefit, they will choose to stay longer at work, which 
will result in their spouses having even greater responsibility to 
care for their children.124 Keeping the benefit “mothers only” thus 
 
119  State of Israel v. Levi et. al, Conclusion §§ 1–4. 
120 Id. § 57. 
121  National Labor Court [NLC] 361/08 Medinat Israel v. Bahat [State of 
Israel v. Bahat] (Apr. 18, 2010) Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) at *32. 
The dissenting judge, however, stated that the right to receive an extra payment 
for those hours was indeed a right pertaining to parenthood, and therefore should 
be given equally to mothers and fathers. Id. at *30 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting). 
122  Id. at *27, cited with approval in State of Israel v. Levi § 57 
(reaffirming its rational in the Bahat case and stating that the essence of the 
monetary right is to incentivize working mothers to stay at work long hours, 
which will establish substantive equality between mothers-teachers and fathers-
teachers). 
123  State of Israel v. Bahat at *27; State of Israel v. Levi § 57 (quoting 
Bahat). 
124  State of Israel v. Bahat at *27; State of Israel v. Levi §§ 50–51. 
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“does not contradict the equality principle, but the opposite is 
true—it helps to fulfill it.”125 Therefore, paying mothers extra when 
they stay longer at work is not prohibited discrimination against 
fathers but rather affirmative action for women, “the purpose of 
paying mothers for the extra hours they work is to enable them to 
stay at work long hours and thus to promote their status and 
income.”126 Comparable to the analysis of the decisions 
interpreting fathers’ right to a shortened workday,127 the National 
Labor Court believed that gender equality would be accomplished 
when mothers emulated men and adhered to the long-working-hour 
norm.  
While the regional labor courts expanded working fathers’ 
benefits, the National Labor Court stalled that trend. Regardless of 
the outcome, all the decisions shared the view that mothers of 
young children need to receive a monetary incentive to encourage 
them to stay longer at work, so they could be equal to men. The 
courts’ neglect of factors other than hours—such as productivity 
and the quality of the work performed—is disturbing, especially 
because the plaintiffs worked in the public sector.128 The court 
decisions reinforced the hegemony of work and implicitly 
devalued caregiving as an important social activity, thus 
undermining the ability of fathers and mothers to effectively 
combine work and care. 
  
III.       CARE TO SUE: AMERICAN WORKING FATHERS FIGHT TO 
COMBINE WORK AND CAREGIVING 
 
How do American courts—compared to Israeli ones—make 
sense of fathers’ conflicts over work and family? More 
 
125  State of Israel v. Bahat at *26–27 (emphasis in original); State of Israel 
v. Levi § 51 (quoting the Bahat court) (emphasis in original). 
126  State of Israel v. Bahat at *26. 
127 See discussion supra Part I.B.3. 
128 Typically, public employees work fewer hours than their counterparts in 
the private sector. If the courts emphasize hours when dealing with public 
employees, such as teachers and state attorneys, parents working in the private 
sector—where strict time norms usually operate—would probably receive a 
similar (if not stricter) treatment in court.  
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specifically, have antidiscrimination claims been successful for 
American fathers alleging discrimination at work because of their 
dual roles as workers and caregivers? This Part analyzes several 
lawsuits in which American caregivers alleged employment 
discrimination on the basis of their caregiving responsibilities.  
American federal law, unlike its Israeli counterpart, does not 
include “working caregivers” as a protected group. Therefore, 
American fathers are required to prove that they were 
discriminated against based on sex, which is prohibited under the 
law.129 The analysis of the male-plaintiffs’ arguments and the 
judges’ decisions sheds light on gender stereotypes, masculinity 
imperatives and social norms pertaining to work, family, and 
working parents’ ability to integrate the two.  
This section will discuss and analyze four cases in which 
working caregivers alleged sex discrimination. These four cases 
dealt with distinct issues at different time periods: sex 
discrimination in federal law in the 1970’s; leave rights and 
discrimination at public workplaces in the beginning of this 
century; and leave rights and discrimination at a private workplace 
in 2012. This section will evaluate not only the decisions but the 
ways in which the plaintiffs framed their arguments. 
 
129 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1964). Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted to prohibit discrimination against 
employees in the workplace. Title VII provides: “[i]t shall be an unlawful 
employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual 
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, [and] 
national origin.” Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1).  A few states have specific prohibitions in 
their employment discrimination protections based on family responsibilities. In 
Alaska, for example, the statute prohibits discrimination based on “parenthood”, 
inter alia. See Alaska Stat. § 18.80.200 (2006). In the District of Columbia, an 
employer cannot discriminate against an employee based on ‘family 
responsibilities’. See D.C. Code Ann. § 2-1402.11 (2001). There are 63 local 
jurisdictions in 22 states in addition to Alaska and the District of Columbia that 
prohibit this type of discrimination. See Stephanie Bornstein & Robert J. 
Rathmell, Caregivers as a Protected Class?: The Growth of State and Local 
Laws Prohibiting Family Responsibilities Discrimination, CTR. FOR WORKLIFE 
LAW, U.C. HASTINGS COLL. OF L. 1, 1 (2009), http://www.worklifelaw.org/pubs/ 
LocalFRDLawsReport.pdf. 
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A.   Discrimination Against Fathers in Federal Law:  
 Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld (1975)130  
 
As a legal adviser for the ACLU, Ruth Bader Ginsburg created 
a new legal strategy to eliminate sex discrimination using the 
constitutional doctrine of equal protection,131 arguing that “[s]ex-
based state action violates equal protection when it entrenches the 
traditional role divisions that confine men and women to separate 
spheres.”132 Ginsburg challenged laws that reinforced strict sex-
role stereotypes—“males as breadwinners, females as 
homemakers.”133 Indeed, within a decade, the Court had 
incorporated the anti-stereotyping doctrine as part of its equal 
protection jurisprudence.134 Moreover, together with the 
incorporation of the anti-stereotyping doctrine, the Court applied 
intermediate scrutiny to sex-based state actions,135 and stated that 
such actions are constitutional only when they “serve important 
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to 
achievement of those objectives.”136  
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, which Ginsburg litigated, was the 
first case in which a father alleged sex discrimination.137 When 
 
130 Weinberger, 420 U.S. 636. 
131 See Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional 
Sex Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83 (2010) [hereinafter, Franklin, 
Anti-Stereotyping Principle]; see also Stephanie Bornstein, The Law of Gender 
Stereotyping and the Work-Family Conflicts of Men, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1297, 
1299 (2012). 
132 See Franklin, Anti-Stereotyping Principle, supra note 131, at 124 
(describing the new constitutional argument articulated by Ginsburg in the 
Moritz and Reed cases). 
133 See Barbara Stark, Anti-Stereotyping and “The End of Men”, 92 B.U. L. 
REV. Annex 1, 1 (2012); see also Franklin, Anti-Stereotyping Principle, supra 
note 131, at 119–42. 
134 Franklin, Anti-Stereotyping Principle, supra note 131, at 155. 
135 There are three levels of judicial scrutiny, ranging from strict scrutiny 
(the most stringent standard) to intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis review 
(the most deferential). For a discussion of these three levels of scrutiny, see 
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
683–807 (4th ed. 2011).  
136 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). 
137 A very early case brought by a male caregiver was Charles E. Moritz v. 
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Stephan Wiesenfeld’s wife died while giving birth, he became the 
sole parent of the child, yet he was denied Social Security 
benefits—at the time, they were only available to widowed 
mothers and not fathers.138 The Supreme Court held that the statute 
violated the right to equal protection secured by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and granted Wiesenfeld the 
benefits.139 While the case involved a father-plaintiff alleging sex 
discrimination, the focus of his claims—and consequently of the 
Court’s decision—was not the importance of fathers as caregivers. 
Instead, the plaintiff’s arguments, and the Court’s decision 
centered on the issue of discrimination against working mothers.  
 
1. Who is Discriminated Against Anyway? The Framing 
of Plaintiff’s Arguments and the Supreme Court’s 
Decision 
 
Although Wiesenfeld involved a man alleging sex 
discrimination, the vast majority of Ginsburg’s argument focused 
on discrimination against working women.140 Ginsburg realized 
that elaborating on the discrimination against women—especially 
those who worked “like men”—would be an easier argument for 
the all-male Supreme Court to digest. Certainly, it would be easier 
than the argument that men were discriminated against due to their 
role as caregivers, and therefore were entitled to monetary (and 
 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 469 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1972). Moritz 
argued that he was discriminated against compared to single women who were 
entitled to a deduction for the cost of caring for an elderly parent. Id. at 467. The 
Tenth Circuit held that the provision was invalid since it discriminated between 
unmarried males and unmarried females. Id. I will not analyze this case, 
however, since I intend to focus on cases involving fathers and not male 
caregivers in general. 
138 Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 637–38 (1975).  
139 Id. at 636–37.  
140 Ginsburg’s Oral Argument at 23:27, Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 
U.S. 636 (1975) (No. 73-1892), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/ 
1970-1979/1974/1974_73_1892 (“Steven Wiesenfeld’s case concerns the 
entitlement of a female wage earner, a female wage earner’s family to Social 
Insurance of the same quality as that accorded to the family of a male wage 
earner”).  
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other) benefits.141 Thus, she presented the case as discrimination 
against Paula Wiesenfeld and others like her, female workers who 
contributed to Social Security just as male workers, but were 
nevertheless deprived of the insurance because they were women 
and not men.142 These women, who worked and paid into Social 
Security, were unable to get the Social Insurance needed to protect 
their families just because they were women.143 Indeed, Ginsburg’s 
strategy proved successful,144 and the Supreme Court dedicated 
most of its decision to discrimination against working women 
instead of the issue of discrimination against men as caregivers.145 
Justice Brennan, who wrote the majority opinion, stated that the 
provision differentiated between men and women who worked and 
paid into Social Security solely on the basis of gender.146 The 
majority further stated that gender-based differentiation resulted in 
less protection for the families of working women than for the 
families of working men.147  
The Court declared that the assumption that male workers’ 
earnings—but not those of female workers—are vital and 
significant to family survival was an “archaic and overbroad 
 
141 See Franklin, Anti-Stereotyping Principle, supra note 131, at 133–39 
(elaborating on the lawyers’ and judges’ traditional views regarding men as 
caregivers, and describing how the governmental lawyers were suspicious and 
uncomfortable with Wiesenfeld’s request to get “mother’s benefits”). 
142 Ginsburg’s Oral Arguement at 48:57 (“In sum, Appellee respectfully 
requests that the judgment below be affirmed, thereby establishing that under 
this nation’s fundamental law, the woman worker’s National Social Insurance is 
no less valuable to her family than is the social insurance of the working man.”).  
143 Id. at 24:00.  
144 Weinberger, 420 U.S. at 653. See also Transcript of Interview of U.S. 
Supreme Court Associate Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, April 10, 2009, 70 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 805, 815 (2009) (“Most of the Justices thought the law discriminated 
against the woman as wage earner.”). 
145 Weinberger, 420 U.S. at 637.  
146 Id. at 645. 
147 See id. In her article, Franklin argues that Justice Powell and Justice 
Burger perceived the case “as a simple equal pay case.” Franklin, Anti-
Stereotyping Principle, supra note 131, at 136–37. According to the justices, 
“[T]he statute was unconstitutional because it deprived working women of 
benefits that accrued to working men.” Id.  
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generalization not tolerated under the Constitution.”148 The Court 
indicated that even though empirical data showed that in many 
families men were the main providers for their wives and children, 
there are also families where women work and whose earnings 
contribute significantly to the family.149 These female workers pay 
Social Security taxes, but their efforts “produc[e] less protection 
for their families than . . . men’s efforts,” which is gender-based 
discrimination offensive to the Fourteenth Amendment.150 
Moreover, since Social Security benefits decrease as earnings 
increase, the provision would help only those men who are 
similarly socioeconomically positioned to many women—those 
who do earn only little or no money.151 Therefore, the gender-
based classification is not a justified way of helping women. 
Instead, it is “dissimilar treatment for men and women who are . . . 
similarly situated” and is therefore unconstitutional.152  
 
2. Widowers as Legitimate Caregivers 
 
The judges emphasized that a father should be allowed to care 
for his children when the mother is absent, stating that even in a 
family where the father is the main provider and the mother takes 
care of the children the situation can change when the mother dies: 
“It is no less important for a child to be cared for by its sole 
surviving parent when that parent is male rather than female.”153 
And also: “The fact that a man is working while there is a wife at 
home does not mean that he would, or should be required to, 
continue to work if his wife dies.”154 Justice Rehnquist, who filed 
an opinion concurring in the result, stated that “[i]t is irrational to 
distinguish between mothers and fathers when the sole question is 
whether a child of a deceased contributing worker should have the 
 
148 Weinberger, 420 U.S. at 643 (internal citations omitted).  
149 Id. at 645. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. at 653. 
152 Id. (citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971)).  
153 Id. at 652 
154 Id. (emphasis added). 
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opportunity to receive the fulltime attention of the only parent 
remaining to it.”155  
Implicit in these statements is that when both of the parents are 
alive, it is still the woman who should be the primary caretaker. I 
argue that the Court meant to enable fathers to receive “mothers’ 
benefits” only in the exceptional situation of the mother’s death 
and not in the “normal” situation of two living parents. Only in that 
situation does the child’s interest in getting personal care from a 
parent have nothing to do with the gender of that parent. As Cary 
Franklin shows in her article on the development of the anti-
stereotyping doctrine, the idea that Wiesenfeld “might be a victim 
of sex discrimination was treated as a joke.”156 It was almost 
impossible for lawyers, judges, and law clerks to believe that 
Wiesenfeld “genuinely desired to stay home and care for his infant 
son.”157 Franklin writes:  
Behind the scenes, Powell admitted that he found 
the thought of men receiving “mother’s benefits” 
repulsive. He fretted to his law clerk that the 
Court’s decision would induce “a high level of 
indolence” and swell “the ever increasing welfare 
rolls” as men quit their jobs in order to laze about at 
home with their kids.158  
Note Justice Powell’s belief that parents who take care of children 
are “laz[ing] about at home with their kids,”159 meaning that 
childrearing was not true work but akin to a vacation.  
Wiesenfeld, the Supreme Court’s first case involving a father 
who alleged sex discrimination, revealed multiple social 
assumptions. First, working women who “worked like men” were 
worthy of equal rights. Since working men, who were the point of 
reference, paid into Social Security to protect their family in times 
of need, working women who also paid into Social Security should 
be able to protect their families as well. Second, paternal 
caregiving is worthy of protection only when the mother is absent. 
 
155 Id. at 655 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (emphasis added).  
156 See Franklin, Anti-Stereotyping Principle, supra note 131, at 86. 
157 Id. at 87. 
158 Id. at 137. 
159 Id. 
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In that special case, the child who has lost his mother is entitled his 
father’s care.  
 
B.   Discrimination against Fathers in the Public Sector: 
Knussman v. Maryland (2001)160 
  
1. Knussman’s Arguments and Court Decision 
 
Like Wiesenfeld, Knussman argued that his employer 
discriminated against him on the basis of sex in violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.161 
Knussman was a trooper for the Maryland State Police (MSP).162 
Because his wife’s pregnancy was difficult, he asked to “be 
permitted to take four to eight weeks of paid ‘family sick leave’ to 
care for his wife and spend time with his family following the birth 
of his child.”163 His supervisor, however, hold him that he would 
not be entitled to more than two weeks.164 Then, shortly before his 
wife’s delivery, Maryland enacted a new statutory provision that 
allowed state employees to use paid sick leave to care for a 
newborn.165 The new provision permitted a caregiver, which it 
defined as “an employee who is primarily responsible for the care 
and nurturing of a child,” to use up to thirty days of accrued sick 
leave to care for a newborn.166 The statute also provided that a 
secondary caregiver, which it defined as “an employee who is 
secondarily responsible for the care and nurturing of a child” 
would be entitled to take up to ten days of accrued sick leave.167 
Knussman asked for the thirty days of leave but his superior 
officers in the Aviation Division granted him only ten days of paid 
sick leave.168 Moreover, the manager of the medical leave section 
 
160 Knussman v. Maryland, 272 F.3d 625 (4th Cir. 2001). 
161 Id. at 627.  
162 Id. 
163 Id. at 628.  
164 Id. 
165 Id.  
166 Id.  
167 Id.  
168 Id. at 628.  
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of the MSP told him that “only birth mothers could qualify as 
primary care givers; fathers would only be permitted to take leave 
as secondary care givers since they ‘couldn’t breastfeed a 
baby.’”169  
Following the birth of his daughter, given his wife’s health 
problems, Knussman requested to change his status to a primary 
caregiver since he was functioning as the main caretaker of his 
newborn child.170 The manager of the medical leave section of the 
MSP informed him, however, that “God made women to have 
babies and, unless [Knussman] could have a baby, there is no way 
[he] could be primary care [giver] and that his wife had to be ‘in a 
coma or dead,’ for Knussman to qualify as the primary 
caregiver.”171  
The Fourth Circuit held that the employer violated the Equal 
Protection Clause because the personnel manager based the 
decision on gender stereotypes.172 Comparing the case to 
Wiesenfeld, the court concluded that “gender classifications based 
upon generalizations about typical gender roles in the raising and 
nurturing of children” would be rejected as unconstitutional.173 
 
2. The Knussman Case as an Extreme Case 
 
Knussman’s facts were exceptional, and signaled to potential 
plaintiffs that only under extreme circumstances can working 
fathers have equal rights at work due to their role as caregivers. 
Knussman was forced to take leave because his wife was very sick 
and could not care for their newborn daughter. Judge Lee, who 
concurred in the judgment but dissented in the decision to remand 
the case for a trial on damages, strengthened that point:  
[T]he events surrounding the emotional distress 
were significant. . . . During her pregnancy, Mrs. 
Knussman was diagnosed as having preeclampsia. 
This condition extended beyond the birth of their 
 
169 Id. at 628–29.  
170 Id. at 629.  
171 Id. at 629–30.   
172 Id. at 635. 
173 Id. at 636–37. 
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child. . . . This process can progress to a point of 
causing kidney failure, liver failure, or may even 
become fatal. Preeclampsia crippled Mrs. 
Knussman’s ability to function, and to care for her 
newborn child.174 
The facts in the case prove, once again, that fathers take a 
greater role in caring for children when their wives are incapable 
of doing so. In both Wiesenfeld and Knussman, the plaintiffs 
became involved in caregiving because their wives were either 
dead (Wiesenfeld), or sick (Knussman). Moreover, they show the 
harsh attitudes fathers encounter at work when they need to serve 
as caregivers.  
Knussman was also unique in that the explicit stereotyping was 
extreme. This enabled Knussman to argue the case as one of 
straightforward sex discrimination prohibited under the Equal 
Protection Clause.175 In sex discrimination cases it is often difficult 
to prove discrimination since the employer supplies other reasons 
for its seemingly discriminatory conduct, such as business 
necessity and “objective” standards of performance.176 In this case, 
however, the employer denied Mr. Knussman the extra leave 
solely on the basis of his gender, and blatantly and explicitly stated 
its reasons.177   
In sum, like Wiesenfeld, Knussman demonstrates the courts’ 
attitudes that paternal caregiving is worthy of protection only 
under unusual circumstances: Mr. Knussman prevailed arguably 
because he had essentially functioned as a single parent. Moreover, 
he was able to provide strong evidence that enabled him to prove 
that his employer discriminated against him on the basis of sex. 
And yet, although he prevailed, he had to go through a long and 
 
174 Id. at 648 (Lee, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal 
citations omitted). 
175 See Bornstein, supra note 131, at 1337.  
176 See Williams & Tait, supra note 40, at 866–69 (citing cases in which 
employers used such reasons). 
177 See Lindsay Taylor, Family Care Commitment Discrimination: 
Bridging the Gap Between Work and Family, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 558, 563 (2008) 
(referring to Knussman as an extreme case, while stating, “[O]nly stunning cases 
of sex-based discrimination brought by men under Title VII have been 
successful.”). 
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exhaustive process to achieve it. His lawyer aptly described 
Knussman’s “winning”: “Unfortunately, however, Trooper 
Knussman spent five years to get the leave and eight years to get 
the money. . . . Ironically, a case brought under a statute designed 
to provide timely relief for life’s most pressing emergencies has 
now outlasted the Trojan War’s nine-year duration.”178  
Knussman’s long and daunting struggle well exemplifies the 
difficulties plaintiffs face when they seek justice by crossing the 
lines of masculinities norms. And yet, even though he was 
struggling to get merely twenty more days of leave to care for his 
wife and baby, the Eleventh Circuit described him as a plaintiff 
who took “too active a role in child-rearing.”179 This description of 
a father whose request for leave was relatively modest sheds light 
on judges’ views about men as caregivers.  
 
C.   Discrimination against Male Caregivers in the Public 
Sector: Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs 
(2003)180 
 
In 2003, the Supreme Court decided another case brought in 
which a man alleged discrimination based on his family 
responsibilities.181 While the facts of this case involved caregiving 
for a spouse and not children, much of the Court’s opinion 
involved an analysis of the Family and Medical Leave Act 
(FMLA) as a significant provision for working parents. William 
Hibbs’s wife was hurt in a car accident and he took FMLA leave in 
 
178 See Robin R. Cockey, The Family Medical Leave Act: What You See 
and What You Get, 12 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 1, 5 (2003). Cockey 
was the lead trial counsel at the case, and argued it before the Fourth Circuit in 
2001.  
179 See Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir. 2011). In this 
case, the Court had to decide whether an employee was discriminated against 
after she had notified her employer that she was going through a gender 
transition. Id. at 1312–13. The Court ruled that “[a]ll persons, whether 
transgender or not, are protected from discrimination on the basis of gender 
stereotype,” and referenced other cases, among them the Knussman case. Id. at 
1318. See also Bornstein, supra note 131, at 1337 (citing Glenn, 663 F.3d 1312).  
180 538 U.S. 721 (2003). 
181 Id. at 725. 
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order to care for her.182 His employer, the Welfare Division of the 
Nevada Human Resources Department, claimed he had exhausted 
the allowed twelve weeks of unpaid leave and thus was required to 
return to work.183 When he did not, he was fired.184 When Hibbs 
sued his employer under the FMLA, Nevada argued for dismissal, 
alleging it had sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment 
of the United States Constitution.185  
The Supreme Court held that Nevada did not have sovereign 
immunity, because Congress had validly exercised its enforcement 
power under the Fourteenth Amendment when it abrogated the 
states’ sovereign immunity with the enactment of the FMLA.186 In 
delivering the decision of the Court, Justice Rehnquist stated that 
the Act’s purpose was “to protect the right to be free from gender-
based discrimination in the workplace” as well as from gender 
stereotypes.187 The Justice described the legislative history leading 
to the enactment of the FMLA and the Congressional testimony 
that preceded its enactment, including that about the meager 
parental leave offered to fathers.188 He stated that the extended 
maternity leave that certain states offered to women proved that 
such leave was not based on physical needs, but rather on “the 
pervasive sex-role stereotype that caring for family members is 
women’s work.”189  
While one could read Hibbs as supporting coequal parenting 
and fathers as nurturers,190 this vision is more symbolic than 
realistic for at least two reasons. First, although the Court 
acknowledged discrimination against men as caregivers—certainly 
more than it did in Wiesenfeld191—it still focused much more on 
 
182 Id.  
183 Id.  
184 Id. 
185 Id.  
186 Id. at 725–27. 
187 Id. at 728. 
188 Id. at 730–33. 
189 Id. at 731.  
190 See, e.g., Nancy E. Dowd, Fathers and the Supreme Court: Founding 
Fathers and Nurturing Fathers, 54 EMORY L.J. 1271, 1291 (2005); Garcia, 
supra note 11, at 7–8. 
191 Justice Rehnquist’s opinions in these two cases illustrate the change 
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workplace discrimination against women. For example, when 
discussing gender stereotypes, the Court emphasized the 
stereotypes women endure as workers rather than the stereotypes 
men endure as caregivers. The Court emphasized how stereotypes 
“forced women to assume the role of primary family caregiver, and 
fostered employers’ stereotypical views about women’s 
commitment to work and their value as employees.”192 The Court 
does not elaborate on the harm gender stereotypes cause to men, 
never considering the complementary stereotypes regarding 
fathers’ family commitments and their value as caregivers.  
The other reason why the Court’s language was mostly 
symbolic is because it praised the FMLA’s ability to lessen 
working parents’ obstacles when trying to combine work and 
caregiving, despite data showing otherwise. For example, the 
Court criticized the ability of Title VII and the Pregnancy Non-
Discrimination Act (“PDA”) to address the problem of sex-based 
discrimination.193 Thus, it stated, Congress rightly acted in 
enacting the FMLA, which established “a minimum standard of 
family leave for all eligible employees, irrespective of gender,” 
that would undermine the stereotype that only women were 
caregivers.194 Moreover, the Court viewed the FMLA’s gender 
neutrality as making huge strides toward gender equality since 
both women and men were now able to take leave.195 Therefore, 
according to the Court, allowing men to take leave without fear of 
losing their jobs would lead to a growing number of men taking 
 
over time. In Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975), he concurred in 
the result but not with the view that the statute in dispute had reinforced sex 
stereotypes. According to Justice Rehnquist, the case was to be decided solely 
on the issue that “it is irrational to distinguish between mothers and fathers when 
the sole question is whether a child of a deceased contributing worker should 
have the opportunity to receive the fulltime attention of the only parent 
remaining to it.” Id. at 655 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). In Hibbs, however, he 
justified the enactment of the FMLA as an important measure to remedy 
traditional and harmful sex stereotypes regarding women’s and men’s social 
roles. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 730. 
192 Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 736.  
193 Id. at 737.  
194 Id. 
195 Id. at 733–35.  
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responsibility as caregivers. However, in 2003, the year Hibbs was 
heard and decided by the Supreme Court, there was ample data 
showing that the Act had been unsuccessful in changing gendered 
patterns of care and in modifying sex-based stereotypes, especially 
with regard to male caregivers.196   
In conclusion, the Court’s decision in Hibbs, like its decision in 
Wiesenfeld, focused on the discrimination against women in the 
workplace due to social stereotypes about their domestic role. A 
discussion of stereotypical views about male caregiving is almost 
absent. Although the Court praised the FMLA and critiqued gender 
stereotypes, it ignored the fact that the FMLA had failed to change 
gendered patterns of care.  
 
D.   Discrimination against Father-Attorneys at Private Law 
Firms: Ayanna v. Dechert (2012)197 
 
Ariel Ayanna, a male plaintiff, filed this complaint and jury 
demand in 2010, arguing against his employer’s “macho” 
culture.198 Ayanna, who was the primary caretaker of his sick wife 
 
196 According to two surveys conducted in 1995 and in 2000 by the 
Commission on Family and Medical Leave, the FMLA had a minor effect on 
employees’ leave-taking behavior. See Joanna L. Grossman, Job Security 
without Equality: The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 15 WASH. U. J.L. 
& Pol’y 17, 33, 51–55 (2004) (describing available empirical data on leave-
taking patterns by men which show that the majority of leave takers have been 
women). According to Grossman, in 2003, on the Act’s tenth anniversary, there 
was “only limited cause for celebrating a statute whose contribution to women’s 
true equality has been largely symbolic.” Id. at 19. See also Chuck Halverson, 
Note, From Here to Paternity: Why Men Are Not Taking Leave Under the 
Family and Medical Leave Act, 18 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 257, 263 (2003); Marc 
Mory & Lia Pistilli, Failure of the Family and Medical Leave Act: Alternative 
Proposals for Contemporary American Families, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. 
L.J. 689 (2001). 
197 Ayanna v. Dechert, LLP, 914 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D. Mass. 2012). This case 
emphasizes the ways by which male caregivers at private workplaces suffer 
repercussions at work when they fulfill familial responsibilities. It demonstrates 
the linkage between masculinities norms and workplace norms, especially with 
regard to working hours. In addition, it reveals the legal problems plaintiffs 
encounter when discriminated against due to caregiving responsibilities. 
198 Complaint and Jury Demand, Ayanna v. Dechert, LLP, 914 F. Supp. 2d 
51 (D. Mass. 2012) No. 110-CV-12155, 2010 WL 5344371. 
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and their two sons, was a lawyer who worked for Dechert LLP, a 
global law firm.199 After the birth of his second son, he used all the 
paid paternity leave that his firm offered along with the FMLA 
entitlement, although he returned to work before his FMLA leave 
was over.200 Following his return from leave, he alleged that his 
supervisor treated him with hostility, and monitored his work and 
attendance more closely than that of other associates.201 Later, he 
was given fewer and fewer assignments, and eventually received a 
“fair” rating in his annual performance evaluation based on the 
billable hours he had completed.202 Dechert terminated him four 
months after he returned from the FMLA leave.203 Ayanna sued 
Dechert based on sex discrimination and FMLA retaliation.204 
Similar to Wiesenfeld, Knussman, and Hibbs, Ayanna argued that 
Dechert had discriminated against him due to gender 
stereotypes.205 He claimed that Dechert retaliated against him 
because he had refused to assume a stereotypically “male” role in 
connection with his children.206  
The court dismissed Ayanna’s claim of disparate treatment sex 
discrimination in violation of Massachusetts General Law,207 and 
issued an order in Dechert’s motion for summary judgment.208 
Since the law prohibits discrimination against employees based on 
sex, but not based on family responsibilities,209 the court ruled that 
 
199 Ayanna, 914 F. Supp. 2d at 52. 
200 Id. at 52–53.  
201 See Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 198, at paras. 51, 52, 58, 
59, 64, 65. 
202 Ayanna, 914 F. Supp. 2d at 52. See also Complaint and Jury Demand, 
supra note 198, at paras. 52, 58, 69–71. 
203 Id. at paras. 69, 71. 
204 Ayanna, 914 F. Supp. 2d at 53.  
205 See Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 198, at Counts I–IV.  
206 Ayanna had originally alleged violations of the FMLA, Title VII, and 
the ADA as well as sex discrimination under Massachusetts law. Id. He later 
dismissed his Title VII and ADA claims. See Ayanna v. Dechert LLP, 914 F. 
Supp. 2d 51, 53 (D. Mass. 2012). 
207 Ayanna, 914 F. Supp. 2d at 53. 
208 Id.  
209 The statute provides :  
[A]n employer, by himself or his agent, because of the race, 
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Ayanna did not show any facts proving he had been discriminated 
against and was ultimately fired because of his sex.210 However, 
the court denied the firm’s motion for summary judgment 
regarding Ayanna’s claims of retaliation under the FMLA.211 The 
court stated that there was a question of fact whether Ayanna was 
fired solely because of his low billable hours, as Dechert claimed, 
or—as Ayanna claimed—because his termination was a form of 
retaliation against him for taking the leave.212  
The following sections review and analyze the main issues this 
case evoked: the connection between masculinities and work 
norms; the lawyers’ decision to frame their arguments against a 
“macho” workplace; and the problems plaintiffs face when 
alleging employment discrimination based on caregiving 
responsibilities. 
 
1.  The Operation of Masculinities Norms According to 
Ayanna’s Complaint 
 
The facts of the case strongly manifest how masculinity 
imperatives operate at work in general, and law firms in particular. 
According to Ayanna’s claims, as soon as he fulfilled his 
caregiving duties and took care of his wife and sons, his 
workplace’s attitudes toward him changed. Dechert refused to let 
him use his vacation time to cover his salary while he took FMLA 
leave,213 retaliated against him  by not assigning him enough work 
 
color, religious creed, national origin, sex, sexual orientation, 
which shall not include persons whose sexual orientation 
involves minor children as the sex object, genetic information, or 
ancestry of any individual to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or 
to discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate 
against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions 
or privileges of employment, unless based upon a bona fide 
occupational qualification. 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4(1) (2012).  
210 Ayanna, 914 F. Supp. 2d at 57. 
211 Id. at 56.  
212 Id.   
213 See Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 198, para. 49 (Ayanna 
argued that Dechert advanced vacation time for other associates when they took 
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after he returned from leave,214 and negatively evaluated his 
performance on the basis that “personal issues” badly affected his 
work.215 
Dechert’s treatment of Ayanna is consistent with research in 
sociology and social psychology which shows that fathers are 
penalized when they do not behave as their gender role dictates 
and instead “dare” to be engaged parents.216 For instance, 
employers evaluated caregiving fathers less favorably than other 
male workers who acted according to gender expectations.217 Such 
 
leave for other purposes.). 
214 Id. para. 51. 
215 Id. para. 71. 
216 See, e.g., Catherine Albiston, Institutional Perspectives on Law, Work, 
and Family, 3 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 397, 410 (2007) [hereinafter Albiston, 
Institutional Perspectives] (reviewing several empirical studies which showed 
the penalties men suffered at work when they took parental leave, and arguing 
that “those who violate expected gender roles are penalized”); J.L. Berdahl & 
S.H. Moon, Workplace Mistreatment of Middle Class Workers Based on Sex, 
Parenthood, and Caregiving, 69 J. SOC. ISSUES 341, 358 (2013) (showing that 
working fathers who are involved in caregiving experience more harassment and 
mistreatment than fathers who are not involved in caregiving, and than men 
without children); S. Coltrane et al., Fathers and the Flexibility Stigma, 69 J. 
SOC. ISSUES 279, 297–98 (2013) (showing that men who modify their 
employment due to family reasons earn significantly less than other workers in 
the future); Kessler, supra note 11, at 45–46; Michael Selmi, Family Leave and 
the Gender Wage Gap, 78 N.C. L. REV. 707, 758–59 (2000) (discussing the 
penalties men suffer at work when they take leave because their behavior 
“violates the prevailing gender norms”); Michael Selmi, The Work-Family 
Conflict: An Essay on Employers, Men and Responsibility, 4 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 
573, 587 (2007) (arguing that men who take leave are acting out of stereotype, 
which “means adopting a behavior associated with women that employers 
already penalize . . . .”); J.A. Vandello et al., When Equal Isn’t Really Equal: 
The Masculine Dilemma of Seeking Work Flexibility, 69 J. SOC. ISSUES 303, 316 
(2013) (showing that men who asked for flexible work arrangements have been 
perceived as less masculine).  
217 See, e.g., Bornstein, supra note 131, at 1323 (claiming that men who 
have taken FMLA leave have suffered penalties at work since they have 
transgressed the gender stereotype that men should be breadwinners); Lori 
Jablczynski, Note, Striking a Balance Between the “Parental” Wall and 
Workplace Equality: The Male Caregiver Perspective, 31 WOMEN’S RTS. L. 
REP. 309, 317 (2010) (citing studies which found that fathers had suffered more 
penalties than mothers when they took parental leave or worked part-time); L.A. 
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“gender-policing” demonstrates one of masculinities theory’s core 
principles: that there is a hierarchy among men and not all men 
benefit from a masculine work culture.218 Ayanna certainly did not 
benefit from his firm’s work culture. Moreover, in order to put 
Ayanna “in place” and maintain the gendered order, senior 
associates at Dechert would brag about not spending time with 
their families, and mocked in front of other senior and junior 
associates for doing so.219 This kind of behavior did not just signal 
to Ayanna that his “work/life balance” was intolerable to the firm, 
but intolerable to his colleagues as well. Indeed, according to the 
lawsuit, “Ayanna’s colleagues, both partners and associates, knew 
about Ayanna’s role as an equal co-parent and that he did not 
fulfill the “macho” stereotype.”220 They also saw how he was 
criticized and publicly humiliated for trying to integrate work and 
family—it is therefore unsurprising that male attorneys at Dechert 
took neither the full twelve weeks of FMLA leave nor the full 
amount of paid paternity leave the firm’s policy provided.221  
As masculinities theory has shown, men operate with the goal 
of impressing other men, as they feel that they “are under the 
constant careful scrutiny of other men.”222 Ayanna’s employer 
 
Rudman & K. Mescher, Penalizing Men Who Request a Family Leave: Is 
Flexibility Stigma a Femininity Stigma?, 69 J. SOC. ISSUES 322, 336–38 (2013) 
(showing that male workers who asked for family leave were viewed as poor 
workers); Williams & Tait, supra note 40, at 865–66 (“[D]iscrimination against 
male caregivers takes various forms, including holding men with family 
responsibilities to higher standards, hyper-scrutinizing their work, interfering 
with their ability to take leave as guaranteed by the Family and Medical Leave 
Act (FMLA), or retaliating against men who take FMLA leave (typically via 
wrongful demotion or termination).”). 
218 See Dowd, Masculinities and Feminist Legal Theory, supra note 7, at 
233–34. 
219 See Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 198, para. 18. 
220 Id. para. 17. 
221 Id. para. 46. 
222 Michael S. Kimmel, Masculinity as Homophobia: Fear, Shame, and 
Silence in the Construction of Gender Identity, in THE GENDER OF DESIRE: 
ESSAYS ON MALE SEXUALITY 25, 33 (2005) (explaining masculinity as a 
homosocial enactment). See generally MICHAEL KIMMEL, MANHOOD IN 
AMERICA: A CULTURAL HISTORY (1996) (providing a history of U.S. 
masculinity). 
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disproportionately scrutinized him and expressed to the other male 
attorneys that if they wanted to be regarded as masculine and be 
securely employed, they should not be involved in caregiving. 
Furthermore, the fact that male attorneys did not use leave benefits, 
not even the paid paternal leave that the firm allowed, shows how 
masculinities and institutional norms are intertwined. 
Organizations may have a formal policy with progressive 
arrangements for caregivers for symbolic and legal reasons, yet the 
workplace atmosphere might be at odds with this formal policy.223 
This is one of the reasons why many employees, mainly men, do 
not use work-family arrangements even when their employers 
formally provide them.224 The organization’s behavior can stem 
from traditional masculine views of men as breadwinners and 
women as caregivers. Therefore, institutions have a compelling 
power to encourage or discourage men from taking leave, and thus 
support or hinder more equal family caretaking arrangements.225 
Even though Dechert’s formal policy provided fathers with four 
weeks of paid leave, the firm’s culture effectively discouraged 
them from using it. 
 
2.   Arguing Against a “Macho” Work Culture: An Analysis of 
Ayanna’s Complaint and the Court’s Decision 
 
Ayanna’s lawyers had a complex case to litigate: they 
represented a male lawyer who worked for a private law firm that 
adhered to the billable hour system.226 In such a system, employees 
are measured by the hours they put in: the more hours the better. 
Evidently, given these demands, lawyers at these firms find it very 
 
223 See Albiston, Institutional Perspectives, supra note 216, at 409–11 
(arguing that sometimes “internal organizational cultures discourage workers 
from making use of [work/family] policies”); see also Catherine R. Albiston, 
Bargaining in the Shadow of Social Institutions: Competing Discourses and 
Social Change in Workplace Mobilization of Civil Rights, 39 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 11, 12–13 (2005). 
224 See Albiston, Institutional Perspectives, supra note 216, at 411 (arguing 
that “studies suggest that institutions, in the form of organizational processes 
and cultural norms, reduce the likelihood that men will take parental leave”). 
225 See id. 
226 See Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 198, para. 52. 
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difficult to be engaged parents since they have to spend most of 
their time working.  Ayanna’s lawyers were probably aware of this 
conflict and chose to frame the case around the argument that the 
plaintiff’s familial obligations had not interfered with his ability to 
put in the long hours that the firm demanded. However, they 
evoked another argument, namely that the firm had a “macho” 
culture “which praises and encourages male associates and partners 
to fulfill the stereotypical male role of ceding family 
responsibilities to women.”227 Therefore, on the one hand, the 
plaintiff argued that the firm had a “macho” culture that praised the 
male attorneys who had worked for many hours; and on the other 
hand, he argued that he had been able to adhere to these demands 
of working very long hours. This combination of arguments was 
incoherent and illogical as it presented Ayanna as a superhuman 
being who could work 70-80 hours a week and take care of his 
family. At no point, however, did Ayanna connect the “macho” 
culture at the firm to its long working hour norm. For instance, 
Ayanna argued that when he had worked on a project with one of 
the partners, Ayanna “left work at approximately 9:00 p.m. after 
completing his portion of a project he was working on with partner 
Anthony Zacharski.”228 Yet even after leaving at 9:00 p.m., 
Ayanna felt he had to further explain his leaving at this hour: 
“[T]here was no reason for Ayanna to stay that night as Zacharski 
had not directed Ayanna to stay nor was there any other reason.”229 
Nevertheless, the complaint continued, when he left at 9:00 p.m., 
Zacharski “immediately assumed Ayanna had a ‘conflicting’ 
family obligation and chastised him the following day for 
leaving . . . Zacharski was responding to the reputation Ayanna had 
in the firm as a man who adopted a traditionally ‘female’ role.”230 
(One should wonder how leaving work at 9:00 p.m. can be 
regarded as adopting a traditionally “female” role). The lawyers 
continued this line of argument: “[A]s the project continued, 
Ayanna worked long days, all seven days of the week, and over the 
 
227 Id. para. 11. 
228 Id.  
229 Id. para. 25.  
230 Id.  
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July 4th weekend.”231 He also worked from home.232 Moreover, 
the plaintiff’s lawyers repeatedly emphasized that Ayanna’s family 
responsibilities did not affect his working hours:  
Ayanna’s caregiving responsibilities never       
detracted from his fulfilling the requirements of his 
position at Dechert. Ayanna regularly was at the 
office until 7:00, 8:00, 9:00 p.m. or even  later, and 
he often worked late into the night from home. He 
never missed a deadline and was never unavailable 
even if he was not physically in the office.233  
In addition, as if working daily until late hours was not enough, the 
lawyers argued that Ayanna was always available for work: 
“Ayanna always took his laptop and Blackberry home with him, 
was available to work on assignments from home at any time, at all 
hours, and was available to come into the office on the 
weekends.”234 
The framing of a case is the lawyers’ choice, and Ayanna’s 
lawyers chose to put the focus on the number of hours Ayanna had 
worked. They presented evidence that, even though he had familial 
obligations, those obligations “never interfered with the 
requirements of being an associate at Dechert.”235 While Ayanna’s 
lawyers assumed that their client had a better chance of winning 
the case if he showed that he had conformed to the employer’s 
demands rather than challenge them,236 their choice of not 
 
231 Id. para. 26. 
232 Id. para. 60 (“Ayanna regularly worked late at the office and even 
worked from home.”).  
233 Id. para. 66.  
234 Id. para. 67. 
235 Id. at 1–2. The question that comes to mind is: how is it possible, 
technically and practically, to work daily at the office until late hours, including 
on weekends and holidays, as well as be available all the time and also fulfill 
family obligations?   
236 Ayanna’s lawyers’ strategy is probably based on their acquaintance with 
courts’ interpretation of Title VII and the latter’s reluctance to undermine work 
practices. See generally Albiston, Institutional Inequality, supra note 46, at 1133 
(“[A] close analysis of Title VII doctrine reveals that courts have left little 
doctrinal room for challenging facially neutral work practices that nevertheless 
construct the meaning of gender.”). 
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criticizing the firm’s work practices helps to reinforce them. In 
other words, by showing how Ayanna had conformed to the 
employer’s demand of working very long hours, the lawyers 
condoned and strengthened the same macho culture they had 
argued against. 
An alternative framing of the case could have been that the 
long working hour norm is in effect a masculine feature of the 
workplace,237 mainly because of its incompatibility with caregiving 
duties. To prove that point, the lawyers could have argued that 
while the workplace was historically constructed by and for 
men,238 times have changed as more men today suffer from 
workplaces’ masculine culture when they fulfill their caregiving 
responsibilities.239 Their choice of not evoking claims against 
workplace-time norms, but rather showing how their client obeyed 
these norms, highlights a problematic issue regarding social 
change through the legal system. Since private lawyers want to win 
cases and not undermine the system as a whole, and since legal 
decisions are based on lawyers’ claims, courts’ decisions do not 
necessarily have the ability to bring about social change. 
Indeed, the court’s decision focused on the question of whether 
or not Ayanna actually worked all the hours required of him, 
without questioning the long-working-hour norm itself, and its 
repercussions for Ayanna and other working parents. The court’s 
approach proves how the doctrine of disparate treatment focuses 
on the individual plaintiff without locating problems within the 
 
237 See McGinley, Work, Caregiving, and Masculinities, supra note 14, at 
708 (discussing how certain workplace structures—such as mandatory 
overtime—are gendered structures). Cf. Williams & Tait, supra note 38, at 875 
(discussing the consequences for men who deviate from masculine work 
structures such as taking a leave of absence under FMLA). 
238 See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 46, at 224 (arguing that masculine 
characteristics define everything from insurance coverage to the workplace); 
Acker, supra note 46, at 146–47 (explaining the gendering of social 
organizations).  
239 See supra Parts II and III (examining cases litigated by men alleging 
discrimination against them due to their parental status). See also supra notes 
216–17, and accompanying text (referencing studies that demonstrate the ways 
men have been discriminated against in society and at work due to their parental 
responsibilities). 
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structure of the workplace, such as time norms.240  
 
3. Ayanna v. Dechert and the Problems of Current 
Employment Antidiscrimination Law 
 
This case demonstrates the normative difficulties plaintiffs 
have when alleging employment discrimination based on family 
responsibilities. Since Title VII lacks a specific protection against 
caregiver discrimination, plaintiffs such as Ayanna are required to 
reformulate their claims as discrimination based on sex and not 
parental status. Therefore, Ayanna argued that he had been 
discriminated against in comparison to female workers at the firm 
who “were not required to be disengaged parents.”241 This case 
also shows that evidentiary issues arise when a plaintiff is forced to 
litigate a caregiving discrimination suit through the sex 
discrimination rubric: often there is clear evidence of intentional 
discrimination because of caregiving responsibilities while there is 
not as clear evidence of discrimination because of sex. For 
example, the court did not accept the claim that Christian, 
Ayanna’s supervisor, was hostile to him because he was a male 
caregiver.242 At most, the court asserted, Christian may have 
disfavored Ayanna for putting family before work, but that, the 
court held, was not illegal.243  
Ultimately, Ayanna was unsuccessful in convincing the court 
that he was discriminated against based on his sex. The court 
rejected the sex discrimination claim and stated that “female 
attorneys who took on caregiving roles also experienced negative 
outcomes at Dechert.”244 A female attorney, for example, was fired 
because she too could not get sufficient work assignments upon her 
 
240 See Catherine Albiston, Institutional Inequality, supra note 46, at 1094 
(“Discrimination in American employment law is personal . . . the vast majority 
of employment discrimination claims advance legal theories that require 
evidence of discriminatory animus. Institutions are, at most, marginal concerns 
for these statutes.”) 
241 Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 201, para. 77. 
242 Ayanna v. Dechert LLP, 914 F. Supp. 2d 51, 56 (D. Mass 2012). 
243 Id.  
244 Id.  
54 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
return from maternity leave.245 Because both working mothers and 
fathers at the firm were similarly situated, meaning they were 
similarly discriminated against, Ayanna was unsuccessful in 
showing that his sex motivated Dechert’s adverse employment 
action.246 
The complexity of claiming sex discrimination when the 
plaintiffs have actually been discriminated against due to their 
family responsibilities has brought scholars to advocate amending 
Title VII to include a specific prohibition on discrimination against 
workers with family responsibilities.247 Such a change would 
separate family responsibilities from the gender of the caregiver.248 
According to the sociolegal scholar Catherine Albiston, “defining 
the protected class in terms of caretaking behavior rather than 
gender does help avoid reifying care as a gendered 
characteristic.”249 The explicit protection of caregiver status would 
also mean that plaintiffs would not have to make the more 
subversive and complex gender-conformity arguments. Moreover, 
such a protection powerfully conveys to both men and employers 
that family obligations are not solely a female responsibility.250 If 
Ayanna had been protected as a caregiver, he would have avoided 
 
245 Id.  
246 Id. 
247 See, e.g., Noreen Farrell & Genevieve Guertin, Old Problem, New 
Tactic: Making the Case for Legislation to Combat Employment Discrimination 
Based on Family Caregiver Status, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1463, 1465-1466 (2008) 
(“This convincing set of data makes a strong case for legislation expressly 
prohibiting FRD. Working in tandem with accommodation laws, laws 
specifically prohibiting discrimination based on family caregiver status are 
necessary to right this employment discrimination wrong.”); see also McGinley, 
Work, Caregiving, and Masculinities, supra note 14, at 722 (“Passage of 
legislation that would prohibit discrimination based on child care responsibilities 
and some type of reasonable accommodation would go a long way toward 
granting working parents the flexibility they need to work and care for their 
children.”).  
248 See Albiston, Institutional Perspectives, supra note 216, at 414. 
249 Id. at 415. 
250 However, according to Albiston, the probable consequence might be 
that the categories of men and women will become categories of caregivers and 
non-caregivers, but nothing will change and caregivers will continue to suffer 
from discrimination. Id. at 405–06.  
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having to compare himself to women with family 
responsibilities—instead, his legal team could have argued that 
attorneys, male and female, who met their caregiving duties, were 
illegally penalized and discriminated against at Dechert.  
Nevertheless, it remains an open question whether such an 
amendment would change judicial interpretations of disparate 
treatment. Would the courts finally locate the problem not in the 
individual but in work practices? Would the court in cases like 
Ayanna criticize the firms’ long working hour norm and its 
harmful effect on working parents? As the Israeli experience has 
demonstrated, even when an antidiscrimination law specifically 
protects parents, courts are still reluctant to challenge or criticize 
workplace norms as unfitting to working parents.251 Thus, it is 
unclear whether or not U.S. courts would be inclined to critically 
examine workplace norms and how they negatively impact 
working parents, even after a modification of Title VII. 
In sum, Ayanna v. Dechert was exceptional in several aspects. 
It was based on a male worker’s claim that he was retaliated 
against and fired due to his role as an active caregiver. Further, this 
plaintiff worked as an attorney at a private law firm that operates 
according to the billable hour system. This combination of factors 
led his lawyers to denounce the “macho” work culture while 
arguing that Ayanna was actually able to adhere to it. They ignored 
the core problem, which is what prevents workers from being able 
to integrate work and caregiving—the demand to stay at work for 
long hours. This problem is especially pervasive in law firms that 
adhere to the billable hour system where lawyers are evaluated 
mainly on the basis of the number of hours they work.  
This case also shows the legal difficulties plaintiffs face when 
they are discriminated against at work due to their familial 
responsibilities. Given Title VII’s failure to protect caregiving 
responsibilities, these plaintiffs are required to prove that they were 
discriminated against based on sex. This lacuna in the federal law 
has led to absurd outcomes, as demonstrated in Ayanna: the court 
rejected Ayanna’s claim of sex discrimination since the firm 
showed that it had discriminated against both female and male 
attorneys. Amending Title VII to include parents and other 
 
251 See supra Part II.B.  
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caregivers as a protected class would have helped Ayanna and 
other parents to fight discrimination at work due to familial 
responsibilities. Whereas such an amendment might not have 
dramatically changed judicial interpretations of disparate 
treatment, it would at least help Ayanna (and other parents) to 
avoid the pitfalls of arguing he had been discriminated against 
based on sex. 
 
IV.       THE MANIFESTATION OF MASCULINITIES NORMS IN THE 
ISRAELI AND AMERICAN CASES: SIMILARITIES AND 
DIFFERENCES 
 
A careful analysis of the cases that Israeli and American fathers 
have brought indicates that gender norms operate in a similar 
manner in both countries. This corroborates other studies showing 
that although masculinities identities are context-dependent, there 
are common characteristics of masculinity in Western societies.252 
As will be elaborated below, four main similarities between Israel 
and the U.S. are evident when looking at court cases brought by 
caregiving men. First, men are penalized when they deviate from 
traditional gender roles. Second, addressing discrimination against 
working mothers is still easier for the courts than acknowledging 
fathers’ difficulties in combining work and family. Third, men tend 
to take an active role in raising their children when their wives are 
incapable of doing so. Fourth, courts still regard workplace 
structure and demands as inevitable, and reinforce the “ideal 
worker” norm, thus prioritizing work over family.  
While the Israeli and American cases have dealt with 
somewhat different aspects of male work/family integration, this is 
mainly because of the differences in the statutory provisions, not 
the gender norms underling the cultures. For example, the focus of 
the Israeli cases has been on interpreting several parental benefits, 
such as parents’ ability to work less and receive monetary 
 
252 See Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Men at Work, Fathers at Home: 
Uncovering the Masculine Face of Caregiver Discrimination, 24 COLUM. J. 
GENDER & L. 253, 272 (2013). 
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benefits.253 These provisions do not exist under the American legal 
system. The U.S. cases, however, have been focused on 
interpreting certain clauses of the Constitution, such as the Equal 
Protection Clause.254 Since Israel does not have a Constitution, this 
kind of analysis is absent in its jurisprudence. Also, the disparate 
formulations of antidiscrimination laws and family leave 
entitlements in the two countries have had significant implications 
for male plaintiffs’ legal claims, and consequently the courts’ 
decisions. For instance, while the Israeli employment 
antidiscrimination law specifically forbids discriminating against 
parents, its American counterpart does not include parents as a 
protected group. Consequently, American parents alleging they 
were discriminated against due to their familial responsibilities 
need to frame their lawsuits as sex discrimination claims.255  
Despite the aforementioned differences, common masculinity 
norms pervade the Israeli and American cases. First, consistent 
with social science studies conducted in Israel and the U.S., these 
cases reaffirmed that men are penalized when they deviate from 
traditional gender roles.256 For instance, the employer in Knussman 
v. Maryland denied the plaintiff’s additional leave requests, and 
made harsh comments regarding his desire to perform as a primary 
caregiver.257 In Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 
Hibbs’s employer fired him after he took FMLA leave to care for 
his injured wife.258 In Ayanna v. Dechert, Dechert penalized 
Ayanna for taking time off to care for his newborn and sick 
wife.259 His supervisor intensely and disproportionately scrutinized 
his work, retaliated against him for taking leave, and ultimately 
terminated him due to his involvement in family responsibilities.260 
 
253 See supra Part I.C. 
254 See supra  Part II. 
255 See supra Part III.D. 
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257 Knussman v. Maryland, 272 F.3d 625, 629–39 (4th Cir. 2001). See 
generally supra Part III.B.  
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These caregiving fathers were punished for transgressing gender 
norms. Interestingly enough, in the Israeli cases, judges expressed 
stereotypical assumptions that the male plaintiffs were giving up 
their careers for their wives.261 The hostile attitude towards men 
who fulfilled familial duties signifies the “gender policing” of men 
who act in contrast to the masculine imperative to avoid acting in a 
“feminine” way.262 Since caregiving is socially associated with 
women, men who nevertheless perform such roles, and dare to 
deviate from their assigned masculine role, are socially 
penalized.263  
Second, Israeli and American courts found it easier to address 
the discrimination working mothers endure rather than the 
discrimination that working fathers endure, which demonstrates 
that both societies prioritize paid work over caregiving. In 
Wiesenfeld, for example, the Supreme Court dedicated most of the 
decision to the discrimination against Wiesenfeld’s wife.264 
Moreover, the idea that a father wanted to stay home to care for his 
child elicited disbelief from some judges and attorneys.265 In 
Hibbs, decided almost 30 years later, the Supreme Court’s 
emphasis was still more on strengthening women’s ability to work 
rather than men’s ability to nurture. At no point did the Court refer 
to the momentous importance of men as caregivers and the positive 
outcome their involvement confers upon their families. 
In the Israeli cases, the judges referred only to the stereotyping 
of women as caregivers, a limiting cultural definition that impacts 
women’s ability as workers.266 The courts never considered 
gendered stereotypes of men as disingenuous or invalid caregivers. 
In Yahav and Moscolenco, the courts allowed fathers to work less 
so that mothers could work more.267 All the cases disregarded the 
 
64, 65. See also supra Part III.D.1. 
261 See supra Part II.B. 
262 See supra Part I. 
263 Id.; see also supra notes 216–17, and accompanying sources.  
264 Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 637–38 (1975).   
265 See supra Part III.A. 
266 See generally supra Part II.  
267 See supra Part II.B. 
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importance of fathers caring for their children,268 even though a 
myriad of data showed that caring and engaged fathers are 
important to the wellbeing of their children and families.269 
Regarding fathers as “the second sex” when it comes to caregiving, 
and also as secondary and even incompetent parents,270 
demonstrates one of masculinities theory’s core principles: gender 
privilege and power come with a price.271 Gender policing of men 
that forces them to work as if they do not have family 
responsibilities comes at the expense of fathers’ relationships with 
their families.272 
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has a positive effect on the fathers themselves as well as on their children). 
270 See DOWD, THE MAN QUESTION, supra note 13, at 120. 
271 Id. at 105. See also Dowd, Fatherhood and Equality,  supra note 33, at 
1058 (contending that “[i]ronically, being the breadwinner privileges, but it also 
subordinates”). With regard to Israeli fathers, see Hollander, supra note 21, at 
317–22 (arguing that even those who are privileged by work recognize that they 
pay a price). 
272 See Joan C. Williams & Stephanie Bornstein, Caregivers in the 
Courtroom: The Growing Trend in Family Responsibilities Discrimination, 41 
U.S.F. L. REV. 171, 174 (2006) (“Ironically, maintaining an ideal-worker norm 
designed around traditional notions of male life patterns results in gender 
discrimination against men, too. Expecting full-time, uninterrupted work from 
men assumes that they have a free-flow of domestic support (i.e., a housewife), 
which has the effect of policing men into an outdated, stereotypical gender 
role.”); see also Dowd, Fathers and the Supreme Court, supra note 190, at 1321 
(“One of the most enduring fatherhood roles is the father as breadwinner, but 
that role fails to incorporate nurture, sacrificing nurture for gender-defined 
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The third similarity between the Israeli and American cases is 
manifested in the facts of the cases, showing that the plaintiffs took 
an active role in raising their children when their wives were 
incapable of doing so. In Wiesenfeld, the mother had died, and in 
Knussman and Ayanna, the mothers were sick. In the Israeli cases, 
however, mothers could not be with the children because of work. 
Indeed, as masculinities theory has demonstrated, fathers’ main 
responsibility is to provide for their families financially,273 and at 
best function as “second string caregivers.”274 If they are 
nevertheless required to engage in serious and significant 
caregiving, it is because they do not have a wife who can perform 
that role.275 By the same token, being engaged in care is regarded 
as voluntary and optional for Israeli and American fathers and not 
part of their identity as men.276 
Lastly, and most importantly, the courts in both countries 
accepted workplace structure and demands as a given, 
demonstrating how judicial interpretations of antidiscrimination 
laws reinforce gender inequality. Neither the Israeli nor the 
American court decisions challenged the current structure and its 
incompatibility with most working parents’ needs. Instead, the 
courts based their decisions upon cultural meaning of work and 
caregiving, refraining from challenging work practices and 
schedules, although the statutory language permits different    
 
economic responsibility”). For a discussion of the prices Israeli men pay for 
gender norms, see Hollander, supra note 21, at 317–22 (her empirical study has 
shown that Israeli men pay a high price for the social demand to function as 
breadwinners, which is a constrained and demanding role. As a result, they have 
to make compromises as fathers and partners). 
273 See supra Part I.  
274 I would like to thank professor Catherine Albiston for suggesting this 
term. 
275 See Dowd, Fatherhood and Equality, supra note 33, at 1063             
(“[W]hile men are equally capable of care work, many men do so not by choice 
but only when they are forced into becoming a caregiver because of divorce, 
unemployment, or the death of a spouse.”). 
276 See id. at 1061–62. In Israel, see Daphna Hacker, Motherhood, 
Fatherhood and Law: Child Custody and Visitation in Israel, 14 Social & Legal 
Studies 409, 425 (2005) (“[T]he Israeli legal field reinforces the gendered    
perceptions of parenthood by turning the question of maternal custody into a 
non-issue, by constructing fatherhood as an undefined voluntary role. . . . .”) 
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interpretations.277 The idea that both parents should be able to 
integrate work and family, for the sake of themselves and their 
children, was never considered as an option. For example, the 
courts never even contemplated alternatives to the measuring of 
employees’ hours at the office, such as focusing on employees’ 
results and incentivizing productivity.278 Moreover, although the 
cases were brought by men who were penalized only because they 
deviated from their traditional gender stereotypical role, neither 
decision criticized the employers’ discouraging attitude toward 
fathers who combine work and caregiving. While one might argue 
that challenging work practices are not the courts’ role, the courts 
in fact have been prohibiting employers’ decisions when they had 
been based upon gendered stereotypes.279 Therefore, as the next 
Part will show, the use of masculinities theory as part of the gender 
anti-stereotype doctrine could further expose the role of culture 
and norms pervading many work practices. 
Note, however, that a main difference between the Israeli and 
American cases involves the judges’ views towards the role of 
mothers as workers. A vast majority of the Israeli decisions was 
dedicated to the prevalent discrimination against working women, 
especially working mothers. Therefore, the judges’ rationale in 
allowing fathers to work less was that women could progress at 
work by working more hours. The National Labor Court’s 
rationale in Bahat and Levi, which disallowed fathers to receive 
monetary benefits if they stayed beyond the shortened day, was a 
sort of an affirmative action for women.280 The Judges perceived 
the monetary benefit as a financial incentive that encouraged 
mothers to forego shortened workdays and instead work longer 
 
277 Catherine Albiston, Institutional Inequality, supra note 46, at 1093 
(contending that “courts remain reluctant to enforce changes to employers’ 
established work schedules and leave policies, even when the statutory language 
is consistent with requiring these changes”). 
278 See, e.g., Vicki Schultz, Life’s Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1957 (2000) 
(“A reduced workweek should alleviate work-family conflict for everyone and 
help promote greater sharing of employment and housework among men and 
women.”). 
279 See Parts III.B. and III.C. 
280 See Part II.C. 
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hours.281 Compared to the Israeli judges, American judges have not 
taken the same path of strengthening fathers’ caregiving role as a 
means for mothers to spend more hours working. While the 
American courts did criticize the historical workplace 
discrimination against women and the gender stereotypes towards 
them, they did not press women to work longer hours as their 
Israeli counterparts did.  
The comparative analysis of these cases reveals that Israeli and 
American judges have common views on men’s role as caregivers, 
and work structure. It has also exposed the inability of judges to 
conceptualize the harms that men, as gendered beings, suffer as 
caregivers. Therefore, incorporating masculinities theory into 
future legal claims of working fathers can help to illuminate these 
harms and combat biases against male caregivers. In order to 
further that goal, the next section develops a legal framework for 
plaintiffs and judges in future work-family cases in Israel and the 
U.S. 
 
V.       ESTABLISHING A REFORM IN THE COURTS BY 
INCORPORATING MASCULINITIES THEORY INTO WORK-
FAMILY CASES  
 
As demonstrated earlier, several factors have been 
accumulatively responsible for creating work-family conflicts for 
fathers. In this Part, I propose to incorporate masculinities theory 
into lawsuits and court decisions dealing with work-family 
issues.282 Doctrinally, masculinities theory can be used in sex 
discrimination cases under a gender anti-stereotyping principle. 
This theory could shed light on the nuances of cultural gender 
norms and expectations while making actionable penalties imposed 
 
281 Id. 
282 Judicial decisions have a crucial role in advancing or hindering social 
change for working fathers. These decisions are significant beyond simply being 
“solutions” to the specific cases; the published decisions will be used by future 
potential claimants, guiding them on the potential merits of their case. See 
CATHERINE R ALBISTON, INSTITUTIONAL INEQUALITY AND THE MOBILIZATION 
OF THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT: RIGHTS ON LEAVE 188 (2010); see 
also Paul Burstein, Legal Mobilization as a Social Movement Tactic: The 
Struggle for Equal Employment Opportunity, 96 AM. J. SOC. 1208 (1991). 
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on workers for failing to conform to gender stereotypes.  
Studies indicate that lawyers and judges base their 
understanding of a person’s behavior on implicit assumptions 
regarding the activity and the person performing it,283 and they 
might incorrectly interpret behavior based on stereotypes and 
cognitive bias.284 One of the major harms of stereotypes is that 
they lead to the treatment of an individual based on his or her 
supposed group trait and not on that individual’s capabilities.285 
Therefore, being familiar with masculinities theory and taking it 
into account can help decision-makers view and interpret persons’ 
behaviors differently.286  
In practice, plaintiffs in disparate treatment discrimination 
cases can use social science literature on stereotyping in order to 
“educate the court about the role of unexamined bias and 
stereotyping in the decision-making process.”287 Actually, 
incorporating stereotyping evidence in claims of sex discrimination 
is not new, and courts have been embracing this evidence for 
decades.288 The novelty, however, is to incorporate masculinities 
theory and masculinities social psychological evidence as part of 
the gender stereotyping evidence. Empirical social psychology 
studies can demonstrate biases against caregivers, especially male 
caregivers, and help plaintiffs establish their cases using 
circumstantial evidence that “may reveal a pattern of continuing 
bias.”289 For example, using evidence from social and cognitive 
psychology could have helped Ayanna persuade the court not to 
accept Dechert’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of 
disparate treatment sex discrimination. Since the court was 
required to make inferences against the defendant, Ayanna could 
have claimed that social cognition research explained Dechert’s 
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283 See MASCULINITIES AND THE LAW, supra note 13, at 8. 
284 Id. 
285 Id. 
286 Id. 
287 See Williams & Segal, supra note 7, at 131–32. 
288 American courts have been accepting this evidence since the 70’s. See 
Joan C. Williams, Double Jeopardy? An Empirical Study with Implications for 
the Debates over Implicit Bias and Intersectionality, 37 HARV. J.L. & GENDER  
222 (2014). 
289 Id. at 133. 
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behavior as part of its cognitive bias against male (and female) 
caregivers.290 Further, using masculinities theory as part of a 
gender anti-stereotyping principle saves plaintiffs the need to find 
comparative evidence.291 Thus, male plaintiffs who argue they 
have been discriminated against due to illegal gender stereotypes 
of masculinity can focus the claims on caregiving men and their 
hurdles. By exposing the stereotypes that caregiving men 
encounter at work, masculinities theory can strengthen male 
plaintiffs’ legal claims in work-family cases.  
What does it mean for lawyers and judges to incorporate 
masculinities theory into their lawsuits and decisions, respectively? 
First, it means encouraging discussions of men’s experiences and 
acknowledging that it is not solely women who suffer from gender 
norms and social expectations—men also experience gender 
harms.292 Therefore, men’s experiences with disempowerment, 
bias, and oppression should be explored.293 Incorporating 
masculinities theory also means questioning the traditional 
association between breadwinning and masculinity that, along with 
masculine workplace structures, has resulted in reduced options for 
fathers to provide care for their families.294 As a practical tool, 
judges can ask “the man question,” which examines prevailing 
cultural assumptions and norms to which men are subject,295 and 
asks how men—as gendered subjects—are situated in relation to a 
certain policy. Asking “the man question” will enable courts to 
 
290 See id. at 132–33. 
291 See Catherine Albiston, supra note 46, at 1154 (“Stereotype theories are 
enormously useful because they allow plaintiffs to proceed without difficult-to-
obtain comparative evidence . . . ”). 
292 See Schrock and Schwalbe, supra note 13, at 288–89 (claiming that 
while men as a group can benefit from sexist ideology, some “manhood acts can 
sometimes reproduce inequalities in ways that disadvantage subgroups of 
men”); Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 252, at 259–60. 
293 Nancy Levit, Feminism for Men: Legal Ideology and the Construction 
of Maleness, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1037, 1088 (1996). 
294 See Abrams, supra note 42, at 761 (arguing that “unless the norms that 
support a link between masculinity and provider status are identified,  analyzed, 
and gradually revised,” we can expect no improvements to fathers’ work-family 
conflict). 
295 See Nancy E. Dowd, Asking the Man Question: Masculinities Analysis 
and Feminist Theory, 33 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 415, 422 (2010). 
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expose masculinity norms—both at the structural and personal 
level. Courts will then be able to explore how these norms impede 
men’s ability to take care of their families. Shifting the focus to 
fathers’ difficulties in balancing work and caregiving will expose 
the high price men pay for attaining the breadwinner role in the 
family: the subordination of their relationship with their children 
for wage work.296  
Taking the core principles of masculinities theory into account 
also means critiquing and undermining the prevailing cultural 
norm that regards caregiving as feminine, and therefore, as 
primarily a woman’s responsibility. Judges should value and 
strengthen the importance of paternal care as essential to the well-
being of children and fathers, as well as mothers, and as part of 
gender equality.297 To be sure, advocating for caregiving work is 
not new.298 The novelty, however, is in the inclusion of fathers in a 
debate that has been almost exclusively focused on women. 
Moreover, acknowledging fathers’ importance as active parents 
has the potential to transform current workplace norms. However, 
in order for courts to challenge workplace norms and create social 
change for caregivers, they first have to accept that caregiving is 
no less important than paid work.299 For instance, acknowledging 
and embracing paternal care might not have changed the outcome 
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296 WILLIAMS, RESHAPING, supra note 6, at 81 (claiming that “the     
successful breadwinner may incur personal costs that far outstrip his      
earnings”). See also DOWD, THE MAN QUESTION, supra note 13, at 105; Dowd, 
Fatherhood and Equality, supra note 35, at 1058 (“Ironically, being the 
breadwinner privileges, but it also subordinates.”). In respect to Israeli fathers, 
see Einat Hollander, Images of Masculinity and the perception of its costs 
among Israeli Male Adolescents 317-322 (2001) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Bar-
Ilan University) (on file with Bar-Ilan University Library) (arguing that even 
those who are privileged by work recognize that they pay a price). 
297 See Dowd, Fathers and the Supreme Court, supra note 272, at 1312, 
1328. In addition, the household should be viewed as inseparable from 
childcare. Id. at 1314. 
298 See Kessler, supra note 11, at 371.  
299 See Kessler, supra note 11, at 460 (arguing that when “caregiving work 
valued as fundamental to the functioning of society, and to living a full life, then 
the assertion that engaging in such work is a ‘fundamental right’ deserving of 
accommodation or at least nondiscrimination in the workplace would not entail 
a vast judicial leap.”). 
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of Bahat, in which Bahat asked to receive the same monetary 
benefits that mothers receive when they work longer hours during 
shortened workdays. However, it might have changed the rationale 
of the National Labor Court, which denied him these monetary 
benefits. Viewed through the lens of encouraging fathers’ 
involvement in their children’s lives, the Court might have asserted 
that fathers whose workplaces allow parents to work shortened 
days should be incentivized to use such an arrangement. Hence, 
Bahat would not receive monetary benefits if he had decided to 
work more hours rather than use his shortened workday 
arrangement.  
The third core principle of masculinities theory that judges 
should consider is that men feel that other men are evaluating 
them, and thus must constantly prove their manhood.300 This 
feature of male insecurity is strongly manifested in the realm of 
paid work, as men in Western countries gain their status from 
being breadwinners, yet, since jobs are unstable, the status is 
unstable as well.301 Along these lines, research has shown that 
Israeli and American working fathers are strongly influenced by 
their fellow male colleagues’ behavior.302 Hence, fathers are more 
likely to be engaged in caregiving and use parental entitlements 
only if other fathers at their workplaces do the same. Judges should 
take into account this empirical dynamic when investigating 
whether caregiving men have been discriminated against at work. 
One practical way for courts to examine workplace attitudes 
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300 DOWD, THE MAN QUESTION, supra note 13, at 21. See also 
MASCULINITIES AND THE LAW, supra note 13, at 3.  
301 JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK 
CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 25 (2000). 
302 See Rosenblum, supra note 6, at 110 (citing research that has 
demonstrated that, even in Sweden, where benevolent paid parental leave is 
available and the state is supportive of fathers’ involvement in care, peer 
pressure remains very powerful: “[M]ale employees are still more likely to take 
leave only if another father took leave within the previous two years”); see also 
Gershoni, supra note 42, at 63 (In his study of Israeli fathers, Gershoni’s 
interviewees have said that in order for them to be more openly engaged in care, 
employers need to change their perceptions, and other working fathers need to 
publicly exhibit their participation in parenting.). Peer behavior has a greater 
effect on men than the behavior of their own fathers or their partners. DOWD, 
THE MAN QUESTION, supra note 13, at 112. 
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toward male-caregivers is to look at working fathers’ actual use of 
the organization’s work-family policies, as well as the attitudes 
toward those who have used them.303 In that way, employers’ 
practice of merely disclosing its formal parental policies could not 
be used to conceal discrimination against fathers. Rather, 
employers must also disclose the number of workers who have 
actually used these benefits. If the work environment does not 
support working fathers, and in effect they refrain from using the 
parental arrangements (and are penalized at work when they do), 
the employer might be liable for sex discrimination.304 For 
instance, in Ayanna v. Dechert, while Dechert had a formal paid 
parental leave policy, the firm’s culture in effect discouraged men 
from using it.305 The fact that male attorneys did not use leave 
entitlements, not even the paid paternal leave the firm allowed, 
should have been weighed against the firm. 
In conclusion, incorporating masculinities theory in future 
work-family cases has the ability to shed light on gender 
stereotypes and gender bias that working fathers face. Furthermore, 
it will enable the unpacking of the traditional equation between 
breadwinning and masculinity, which hinders many men from 
combining work and caregiving effectively. One of the practical 
ways to incorporate masculinities theory is to ask “the man 
question” in order to examine how men, as gendered subjects, are 
situated in relation to a certain policy. Furthermore, looking at the 
actual number of male workers who have used legal or 
organizational work-family policies can help judges investigate an 
organization’s actual approach towards these workers. 
However, and most importantly, my proposal to take men’s 
hurdles as caregivers into account does not mean ignoring and 
diminishing the centuries of discrimination and harm that women 
have experienced. My intent is the opposite: I hope to advance the 
cause of feminism by drawing attention to the more universal 
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303 See Albiston, Institutional Perspectives, supra note 216, at 402. 
304 See Palazzari, supra note 8, at 468–69.  Palazzari theorizes that fathers 
can use a “hostile work environment claim” when they are denied leave or being 
penalized when they return from leave. Id. Hostile work environment claims are 
most often used in sexual harassment cases.  
305 See supra Part III.D.1. 
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harms of gender-role “policing” and considering the 
interconnected aspects of male and female inequality.306 Therefore, 
taking masculinity imperatives into account will provide a way to 
look specifically at the challenges that fathers face, which are 
different from those of mothers yet intertwined.307 In addition, by 
incorporating a more complex view of men as gendered subjects, 
we will be able to enhance gender equity for the benefit of women, 
children, and men.308 
 
VI.       CONCLUSION 
 
There is a rarely discussed but pervasive problem in Israel and 
the U.S.: employment discrimination against fathers based on sex 
in combination with their family responsibilities. While not great 
in number, several cases—in both Israel and the U.S.—have 
attempted to address this problem. These cases had the potential to 
expose how gender norms, to the detriment of both fathers and 
mothers, inform workplace norms. However, this potential was 
squandered, partly due to the ways the plaintiffs’ lawyers chose to 
frame the claims, which impacted the courts’ reasoning and 
outcomes.  
An incorporation of masculinities theory in future litigation, 
however, has the potential to expose the gendered performances—
and their repercussions—of Israeli and American working fathers. 
Taking masculinities norms into account also means being highly 
skeptical of the traditional equation of masculinity and 
breadwinning. Fortunately, social norms, as well as workplace 
practices, are neither fixed nor natural. Rather, they are socially 
constructed and thus have the potential to be reshaped in a way that 
acknowledges and embraces greater paternal care.  
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306 See MASCULINITIES AND THE LAW, supra note 13, at 38. 
307 See Dowd, Masculinities and Feminist Legal Theory, supra note 7, at 
244. 
308 See Collier, supra note 17, at 472. 
